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INTRODUCTORY CONTEXT 
Canada has a strong tradition of tolerance and respect for 
difference.1 Individuals are free to practice their customs and 
 ∗ John Borrows, Professor and Chair in Aboriginal Justice and Governance, Faculty of 
Law, University of Victoria. The author would like to acknowledge the support of the Law 
Commission of Canada and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council in the 
preparation of this Article. 
 1. These traditions have grown in the past thirty years to include Aboriginal peoples. See 
ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN CANADA: ESSAYS ON LAW, EQUITY, AND RESPECT FOR 
DIFFERENCE (Michael Asch ed., 1997); PATRICK MACKLEM, INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND 
THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (2001); The Right Honourable Chief Justice of Canada Beverly 
McLachlin, LaFontaine-Baldwin Symposium, 2003 Lecture: The Civilization of Difference 
(Mar. 7, 2003), available at http://www.operation-dialogue.com/lafontaine-baldwin/e/2003 
_speech_1.html. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p167 Borrows book pages.doc  2/22/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
168 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 19:167 
 
 
 
traditions as long as they do not inappropriately infringe upon other’s 
legal interests.2 Groups can organize their affairs and associate with 
one another to improve their lives and those of the people around 
them.3 A vibrant constitutional framework supports this respect for 
individual and community belief, conscience, expression, assembly 
and association.4 Canada’s federal structure facilitates laws, customs 
and traditions particular to its various provinces and regions.5 
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees individual 
rights to democratic participation, mobility, due process, and 
equality.6 This instrument enshrines French and English linguistic 
equality.7 Laws are to be “interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of 
Canadians.”8 Charter rights empower people to practice their cultures 
and traditions, and to pursue their goals and aspirations “subject only 
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.”9 
 2. The guarantee of rights in Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms is subject to 
“reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, Canada Act, 
1982, ch. 11, sched. B § 1 (U.K.). 
 3. See generally Dunmore v. Ontario, [2001] S.C.R. 1016; Delisle v. Canada, [1999] 
S.C.R. 989; Canadian Egg Mktg. Agency v. Richardson, [1998] S.C.R. 157; Lavigne v. Ont. 
Pub. Serv. Employees Union, [1991] S.C.R. 211; Prof’l Inst. of the Pub. Serv. of Can. v. Nw. 
Territories, [1990] S.C.R. 367; In re Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Act, [1987] S.C.R. 313; 
Pub. Serv. Alliance of Can. v. Canada, [1987] S.C.R. 424; Saskatchewan v. Retail, Wholesale 
& Dep’t Store Union, [1987] S.C.R. 460.  
 4. Section 2 of the Charter guarantees that “[e]veryone has the following fundamental 
freedoms: a) freedom of conscience and religion; b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and 
expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication; c) freedom of 
peaceful assembly; and d) freedom of association.” Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched. B § 2 (U.K.). 
 5. Id. See generally IAN H. ANGUS, A BORDER WITHIN: NATIONAL IDENTITY, 
CULTURAL PLURALITY, AND WILDERNESS (1997); WILL KYMLICKA, FINDING OUR WAY: 
RETHINKING ETHNOCULTURAL RELATIONS IN CANADA (1998); STRETCHING THE FEDERATION: 
THE ART OF THE STATE IN CANADA (Robert Young ed., 1999); CHARLES TAYLOR, 
RECONCILING THE SOLITUDES: ESSAYS ON CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM (Guy 
Laforest ed., 1993); STEPHEN G. TOMBLIN, OTTAWA AND THE OUTER PROVINCES: THE 
CHALLENGE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN CANADA (1995); JEREMY WEBBER, REIMAGINING 
CANADA: LANGUAGE, CULTURE, COMMUNITY, AND THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION (1994). 
 6. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, Canada 
Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched. B §§ 3–15 (U.K.).  
 7. Id. §§ 16–22. 
 8. Id. § 27. 
 9. Id. § 1. Leading cases interpreting section 1 of the Charter are: Dunmore v. Ontario, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/13
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Canada’s founders rejected the idea of forced cultural coercion, at 
least as it related to the most critical challenges they encountered: 
French and English juridical, cultural, religious and linguistic 
differences.10 The British North America Act of 1867 (the “BNA 
Act”),11 knit a nation together along federal lines to protect these 
differences.12 It enabled French and English speaking peoples to 
continue their unique political, religious, cultural, linguistic and legal 
traditions within provincial frameworks.13 Minority educational rights 
were constitutionally enshrined to ensure that groups could practice 
their traditions, even in provinces where the dominant culture was not 
their own.14 This was the constitutional bargain that brokered 
[2001] S.C.R. 1016; Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada, [1998] S.C.R. 877; Libman v. 
Quebec, [1997] S.C.R. 569; Ross v. N.B. Sch. Dist., [1996] S.C.R. 825; RJR-MacDonald, Inc. 
v. Canada, [1995] S.C.R. 199; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] S.C.R. 927; R v. Oakes, [1986] 
S.C.R. 103. 
 10. A.I. SILVER, THE FRENCH-CANADIAN IDEA OF CONFEDERATION, 1864–1900 (1982). 
 11. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.). 
 12. Of course, there were also other factors that led to confederation. See GARTH 
STEVENSON, UNFULFILLED UNION: CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND NATIONAL UNITY 20–33 (3d 
ed. 1989). 
 13. SILVER, supra note 10, at 33–50. 
 14. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3 § 93 (U.K.). 
In and for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to 
Education, subject and according to the following Provisions:  
(1) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any Right or Privilege with 
respect to Denominational Schools which any Class of Persons have by Law in the 
Province at the Union:  
(2) All the Powers, Privileges, and Duties at the Union by Law conferred and imposed 
in Upper Canada on the Separate Schools and School Trustees of the Queen’s Roman 
Catholic Subjects shall be and the same are hereby extended to the Dissentient Schools 
of the Queen’s Protestant and Roman Catholic Subjects in Quebec: 
(3) Where in any Province a System of Separate or Dissentient Schools exists by Law 
at the Union or is thereafter established by the Legislature of the Province, an Appeal 
shall lie to the Governor General in Council from any Act or Decision of any 
Provincial Authority affecting any Right or Privilege of the Protestant or Roman 
Catholic Minority of the Queen’s Subjects in relation to Education:  
(4) In case any such Provincial Law as from Time to Time seems to the Governor 
General in Council requisite for the due Execution of the Provisions of this Section is 
not made, or in case any Decision of the Governor General in Council on any Appeal 
under this Section is not duly executed by the proper Provincial Authority in that 
Behalf, then and in every such Case, and as far as the Circumstances of each Case 
require, the Parliament of Canada may make remedial Laws for the due Execution of 
the Provisions of this Section and of any Decision of the Governor General in Council 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Canada’s foundation. The BNA Act, while an incomplete governance 
instrument, was nevertheless sufficient to unite disparate peoples. 
George Etienne Cartier, one of the instrument’s architects, observed:  
It was lamented by some that we had this diversity of races, 
and hopes were expressed that this distinctive feature would 
cease. The idea of unity of races [is] utopian—it [is] 
impossible. Distinctions of this kind . . . always exist. 
Dissimilarity, in fact, appear[s] to be the order of the physical 
world and of the moral world, as well as in the political world. 
But with regard to the objection based on this fact, to the effect 
that a great nation [can]not be formed because Lower Canada 
[is] in great part French and Catholic, and Upper Canada [is] 
British and Protestant, and the Lower Provinces [are] mixed, it 
[is] futile and worthless in the extreme. . . . In our own 
Federation we should have Catholic and Protestant, English, 
French, Irish and Scotch, and each by his efforts and his 
success [will] increase the prosperity and glory of the new 
Confederacy. . . . [W]e [are] of different races, not for the 
purpose of warring against each other, but in order to compete 
and emulate for the general welfare.15 
When considering what must be done to ensure Canada’s 
continued strength, one cannot ignore these historically deep and 
constitutionally protected rights and traditions that foster its unity, 
difference and interdependence. Each strand of that fabric must 
remain strong to ensure the country’s peace, order and good 
governance. Canadians strive to develop societal cohesion through 
common allegiance to this historical and legal framework. At the 
same time, differences in tradition must not be sacrificed through 
over-reaching attempts to enforce civic solidarity. The Canadian 
constitutional goal is to reconcile unity and diversity and recognize 
peoples’ continued interdependence, even in the face of difference.16  
under this Section. 
Id. 
 15. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON THE SUBJECT OF CONFEDERATION, 8TH PROVINCIAL 
PARLIAMENT OF CANADA 60 (1865). 
 16. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217, 244–45. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/13
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Some might say the solution to Canada’s challenge of diversity is 
to instill and perhaps even enforce a greater sense of commonality 
within Canada’s population. A variety of suggestions are given to 
address this concern, through, for example, education, the media, 
targeted spending, propaganda, the fostering of artistic and athletic 
excellence, and the creation of national institutions and symbols. For 
others, assimilation is often advanced as an answer.17 Of course, the 
question of who should assimilate who under such policies is not 
easily answered. It is hard to justify why one group should be entitled 
to dominate and absorb others. It is also difficult to secure agreement 
from groups facing assimilation. Given these problems, the “Melting 
Pot” idea may often appear to be an attractive metaphor in 
overcoming differences. This view of society exalts the idea that 
cultures can be blended into a singular system of belief, practice and 
approach to life. This view of cohesion can underestimate the 
inappropriate pressures it places on individual identities and national 
development. 
While much attention and action need to be given to developing 
the bonds of belonging across Canada’s vast cultural cartography, too 
strong a push towards assimilation can have the opposite effect. In 
fact, it could destroy the country. The recent history of the Quebec 
secessionist movement illustrates the dangers of forced 
assimilation.18 English dominance was appropriately overthrown 
because French-speaking people in the province did not want to lose 
their deepest traditions.19 However, some still clamor for complete 
 17. An early example of assimilation is found in LORD DURHAM’S REPORT (Gerald M. 
Craig ed., 1963), in which Lord Durham argued that French-Canadians should be assimilated 
into English Canadian culture. Id. at 34–35. Duncan Campbell Scott spoke to Parliament in 
1920 and stated: “Our object is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has 
not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian question.” ROBERT G. MOORE ET 
AL., THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN ACT 115 (2d ed. 1978). For greater 
context on the policy of assimilation of Aboriginal peoples, see ANDREW ARMITAGE, 
COMPARING THE POLICY OF ABORIGINAL ASSIMILATION: AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW 
ZEALAND (1995). 
 18. IS QUEBEC NATIONALISM JUST?: PERSPECTIVES FROM ANGLOPHONE CANADA 
(Joseph H. Carens ed., 1995); THE REFERENDUM PAPERS: ESSAYS ON SECESSION AND 
NATIONAL UNITY (David R. Cameron ed., 1999). 
 19. JOCELYN MACLURE, QUEBEC IDENTITY: THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM (2003); 
Louis Balthazar, La Dynamique du Nationalisme Québecois, in L’ÉTAT DU QUÉBEC EN 
DEVENIR 37–38 (Gérard Bergeron & Réjean Pelletier eds., 1980). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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separation to more effectively resist assimilation.20 People resist 
forced association and compulsion, particularly if it is contrary to 
their deepest identities. “If a person is compelled by the state or the 
will of another to a course of action or inaction which he would not 
otherwise have chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and he 
cannot be said to be truly free.”21 
Of course, not all associations are voluntary, like the family or 
certain requirements of citizenship; some arise from the “inescapable 
constraints of social life in modern society.”22 However, to the extent 
possible, people should be free to shape and appropriately choose 
their community’s practices and to follow the values that underlie 
those practices. As long as citizens are secure in their fundamental 
rights and freedoms, they should be entitled to live by their choices, 
customs and traditions. Forced association, on the other hand, can 
inhibit an individual’s potential for self-fulfillment.23 Democracy is 
enhanced when people can choose the rules and traditions under 
which they live. Mandatory assimilation is a recipe for resistance and 
continued conflict. Statutory assimilation without social, economic 
and political persuasion, reason and incentive should be rejected as 
contrary to Canada’s legal inheritance. 
Today, there are many cultures and traditions within Canada that 
extend beyond those that gave rise to Confederation.24 A pressing 
contemporary challenge is how to stitch them together without 
shredding society.25 There are some in Canada who despair at the 
 20. See ROBERT YOUNG, THE SECESSION OF QUEBEC AND THE FUTURE OF CANADA (2d 
ed. 1998); ROBERT YOUNG, THE STRUGGLE FOR QUEBEC: FROM REFERENDUM TO 
REFERENDUM? (1999). 
 21. R v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.R. 295, 336. 
 22. Lavinge v. Ont. Pub. Serv. Employees Union, [1991] S.C.R. 211. 
 23. Id.  
 24. In 1971, Canada adopted an official Multiculturalism Policy. RICHARD J.F. DAY, 
MULTICULTURALISM AND THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN DIVERSITY 189 (2000). In the decade 
between 1991 and 2001, Canada welcomed 2.2 million immigrants and refugees. 2001 Census, 
Canada’s Ethnocultural Portrait: The Changing Mosaic, http://www12.statcan.ca/english/ 
census01/products/analytic/companion/etoimm/canada.cfm (last visited Jan. 10, 2006). In 2001, 
5.4 million Canadians were born outside the country, 18.4 percent of the total population. Id. 
For a discussion of the development of diversity in Canada and a critique of its effectiveness, 
see DAY, supra. 
 25. CITIZENSHIP, DIVERSITY, AND PLURALISM: CANADIAN AND COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES (Alan C. Cairns et al. eds., 1999); CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES (Will 
Kymlicka & Wayne Norman eds., 2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/13
p167 Borrows book pages.doc  2/22/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Indigenous Legal Traditions in Canada 173 
 
 
 
diversity of languages, cultures and traditions in our midst. Some 
believe Canadians are weakened as a nation because of their vast 
differences.26 As noted, there have been times in Canada’s history 
when it has come perilously close to dissolving its national bonds 
because of differences. If Canadians want to enjoy a stable future, 
this fear must be acknowledged and addressed. There is no doubt that 
Canada’s cultural complexity can be a daunting challenge to unity. 
Differences can threaten the country’s national integrity and identity. 
Nevertheless, a plurality of traditions need not weaken, threaten or 
overwhelm Canada’s historic and constitutional framework. Its 
history has shown that diversity can be reconciled with unity. Canada 
is best preserved and strengthened by extending this framework. The 
deal brokered at confederation must include more than French and 
English political, cultural, religious or legal traditions. 
Fortunately, as noted, such recognition is already a part of 
Canada’s constitution. Section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms guarantees that individual rights will be “interpreted in 
a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians.”27 Part II, section 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act of 1981 protects the existing culture, practices and 
traditions of Aboriginal peoples throughout the land.28 Rather than be 
threatened by difference, Canadians could take great comfort from 
the fact that respect for diversity is embedded in our central legal 
texts as a significant legal and political aspiration.  
Many countries successfully exist with diverse legal traditions that 
respect different cultural and sub-national groupings.29 Some of these 
countries are bi-juridical, and include both civil law and common law 
systems.30 Others are multi-juridical, and include customary law 
regimes alongside the civil or common law.31 In fact, Canada itself is 
 26. Id. 
 27. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, Canada Act, 
1982, ch. 11, sched. B § 27 (U.K.). 
 28. Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. II, Canada 
Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched. B § 35(1) (U.K.). 
 29. See ESİN ÖRÜCÜ, THE ENIGMA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: VARIATIONS ON A THEME 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 136–43 (2004).  
 30. Scotland, France, South Africa, the United States (Louisiana), Egypt, etc. See id. 
 31. See infra note 235. 
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counted amongst these countries, and it includes common law, civil 
law and indigenous legal traditions. These legal customs are 
constitutionally recognized. Canada is a juridically pluralistic state, 
and draws on many sources of law to sustain order throughout the 
land. While civil and common law traditions are generally recognized 
nationwide, this is not always the case with indigenous legal 
traditions. Yet, indigenous legal traditions can have great force and 
impact in people’s lives despite their lack of prominence in broader 
circles.32 Indigenous legal traditions are a reality within Canada and 
should be more effectively recognized as such. 
I. LEGAL PLURALISM IN CANADA 
A legal tradition . . . is a set of deeply rooted, historically 
conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of 
law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization 
and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or 
should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught.33 
A legal tradition is an aspect of general culture, and can be 
distinguished from a national legal system if a state’s national system 
does not explicitly recognize the force of its legal traditions.34 Legal 
traditions are cultural phenomena that “provide categories into which 
the untidy business of life may be organized” and through which 
disputes may be resolved.35 Sometimes, different traditions can 
operate within a single state or overlap between states.36 This is legal 
pluralism, “the simultaneous existence—within a single legal order—
of different rules of law applying to identical situations.”37 
 32. JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF 
DIVERSITY (1995). 
 33. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN 
AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 3–4 (2d ed. 2000). 
 34. M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-
COLONIAL LAWS (1975). 
 35. Id. 
 36. A.W.B. SIMPSON, INVITATION TO LAW 53–82 (1988). The legal tradition relates the 
legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal system into 
cultural perspective. Systems of legal thought are not necessarily co-terminus with nation state 
boundaries and can be divided into groups or families. Id. 
 37. André-Jean Arnaud, Legal Pluralism and the Building of Europe, http//www.reds.msh 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/13
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Canada is a legal pluralistic state; civil, common and indigenous 
legal traditions organize dispute resolution in different ways, though 
there are similarities between them. The vitality of each legal 
tradition does not just depend on its historic acceptance or how it is 
received by other traditions.38 “[T]he strength of a tradition is not how 
closely it adheres to its original form but how well it is able to develop 
and remain relevant under changing circumstances.”39 If recognized and 
given resources and room to grow, each legal tradition can be relevant 
in contemporary circumstances. A mark of an authentic and living 
tradition is that it points us beyond itself.40 Each of Canada’s three 
major legal traditions is relevant in this respect, and continues to grow 
and remain relevant amidst changing circumstances. 
The earliest practitioners of law in North America were its 
original indigenous inhabitants. These peoples are variously known 
as the “Aboriginal,”41 “Native,” or “First” peoples of the continent 
and include, among others, the ancient and contemporary nations of 
the Innu, Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, Cree, Montagnais, Anishinabek, 
Haudenosaunee, Dakota, Lakota, Nakota, Assinaboine, Saulteaux, 
Blackfoot, Secwepemec, Nlha’kapmx, Salish, Kwakwaka’wakw, 
Haida, Tsimshian, Gitksan, Tahltan, Gwich’in, Dene, Inuit, Metis, 
etc.42 Indigenous peoples’ traditions can be as historically different 
-paris.fr/communication/textes/arnaud2.htm. 
 38. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
[A legal tradition] includes not only a corpus juris, but also a language and a mythos—
narratives in which the corpus juris is located by those whose wills act upon it. These 
myths establish the paradigms for behavior. They build relations between the 
normative and the material universe, between the constraints of reality and the 
demands of an ethic. These myths establish a repertoire of moves—a lexicon of 
normative action—that may be combined into meaningful patterns culled from the 
meaningful patterns of the past. 
Id. at 9. 
 39. Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal 
Thought, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 303, 331. 
 40. See also JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 54 (1984). 
 41. “Aboriginal” in Canadian law includes Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples. Rights of the 
Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. II, Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched. 
B § 35(2) (U.K.). 
 42. A good historic overview of Aboriginal peoples in northern North America is found in 
OLIVE P. DICKASON, CANADA’S FIRST NATIONS: A HISTORY OF FOUNDING PEOPLES FROM 
EARLIEST TIMES (1992). For a description of the contemporary vitality of First Nations in 
Canada, see BOYCE RICHARDSON, PEOPLE OF TERRA NULLIUS: BETRAYAL AND REBIRTH IN 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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from one another as other nations and cultures in the world. For 
example, Canadian indigenous peoples speak over fifty different 
Aboriginal languages from twelve distinct language families, which 
have as wide a variation as do the language families of Europe and 
Asia.43 These nations’ linguistic, genealogical, political and legal 
descent can be traced back through millennia to different regions or 
territories in northern North America.44 This explains the wide 
variety of laws among indigenous groups.  
There is a debate, however, about what constitutes “law” and 
whether indigenous peoples in Canada practiced law prior to the 
arrival of Europeans. Some have said that indigenous peoples in 
North America were pre-legal.45 Those who take this view believe 
that societies only have laws if proclaimed by some recognized 
power that is capable of enforcing such proclamation. Jurist John 
Austin expressed this opinion when he wrote: 
At its origin, a custom is a rule of conduct which the governed 
observe spontaneously, or not in pursuance of a law set by a 
political superior. The custom is transmuted into positive law, 
when it is adopted as such by the courts of justice, and when 
the judicial decisions fashioned upon it are enforced by the 
power of the state. But before it is adopted by the courts, and 
clothed with the legal sanction, it is merely a rule of positive 
morality: a rule generally observed by the citizens or subjects; 
but deriving the only force, which it can be said to possess, 
from the general disapprobation falling on those who 
transgress it.46 
Thus, for legal positivists like Austin, centralized authority and 
explicit command are necessary for a legal system. Unfortunately, 
ABORIGINAL CANADA (1993). 
 43. For an overview of the distinctiveness of First Nations in different regions of Canada, 
see NATIVE PEOPLES: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE (R. Bruce Morrison & C. Roderick Wilson 
eds., 3d ed. 2004). 
 44. For an excellent textual and pictorial representation of the pre-contact geographical 
spaces that First Nations peoples occupied in Canada, see 1 HISTORICAL ATLAS OF CANADA (R. 
Cole Harris ed., 1987). 
 45. Editorial, One Tier Justice, NAT’L POST, Nov. 23, 2004, at A19. 
 46. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 31 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 
Noonday Press 1954) (1832). 
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when one examines the basis for this conclusion, one finds that it 
rests on inaccurate characterizations of indigenous societies. Behind 
Austin’s formulation is the idea that Aboriginal peoples did not have 
law because they were “savage” and “living without subjection” 
because of their “ignorance” and “stupidity” in not submitting to 
political government.47 Opinions that indigenous societies were lower 
on a so-called “scale of civilization” because of their non-European 
organization have not withstood scrutiny. Legal scholars have 
rejected these formulations as a “gross mischaracterization.”48 The 
Supreme Court of Canada has also condemned this approach:  
The assessment and interpretation of the historical documents 
and enactments tendered in evidence must be approached in 
the light of present-day research and knowledge disregarding 
ancient concepts formulated when understanding of the 
customs and culture of our original people was rudimentary 
and incomplete and when they were thought to be wholly 
without cohesion, laws or culture, in effect subhuman 
species.49 
 47. Id. at 184, 258. 
 48. Noted legal theorist Lon Fuller summarized the mischaracterizations of customary law 
in the following terms: 
If, in an effort to understand what customary law is and what lends moral force to it, 
we consult treatises on jurisprudence, we are apt to encounter some such explanation 
as the following . . .: “Customary law expresses the force of habit that prevails so 
strongly in the early history of the race. One man treads across an area previously 
unexplored, following a pattern set by accident or some momentary purpose of his 
own; others then follow the same track until a path is worn.” [This] presents, I believe, 
a grotesque caricature of what customary law really means in the lives of those who 
govern themselves by it.  
Lon L. Fuller, The Law’s Precarious Hold on Life (1968–1969), 3 GA. L. REV. 530, 537–38 
(1969). For further critiques of legal positivism’s view of customary law, see MAX GLUCKMAN, 
POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY (1965); E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF 
PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS (1954); KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. 
ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE 
JURISPRUDENCE (1941); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 7–8 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1917) 
(1864); ANTONIA MILLS, EAGLE DOWN IS OUR LAW: WITSUWIT’EN LAW, FEASTS AND LAND 
CLAIMS (1994); RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO 
COURT (1975); Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1969). 
 49. Calder v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 346.  
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While courts and legislatures are an important source of law in 
Canada, a society does not need to have such institutions to possess 
law.  
In fact, despite the doubts some might hold concerning the 
presence of law in indigenous societies, there has been a long history 
of recognition of indigenous legal traditions by those who 
encountered these societies.50 Europeans’ pronouncements that 
indigenous peoples had no government or law were contradicted by 
their practice of dealing with them through treaties and agreements.51 
There was a long period of interaction between indigenous peoples 
prior to the arrival of Europeans and explorers from other 
continents.52 There were treaties, inter-marriages, re-settlements, war 
and extended periods of peace.53 When Europeans and others came to 
North America, they encountered a complex socio-legal landscape. 
The complexity and scale of the interaction is demonstrated in early 
treaty and marriage relationships.  
The first treaties in North America involved indigenous laws. 
These treaties existed prior to European arrival and recorded solemn 
agreements of how the parties would relate to all parts of their 
world.54 For example, the Haudenosaunee of the eastern Great Lakes 
maintained a sophisticated treaty tradition about how to live in peace 
that involved all of their relations: the plants, fish, animals, members 
of their nations, and members of other nations.55 They also had legal 
traditions that governed a confederacy of relations between nations: 
the Mohawk, Oneida, Onandoga, Seneca and Cayuga.56 This law, 
known as the Great Law of Peace, has served as an inspiration to 
other nations throughout history.57 Like the Haudenosaunee, many 
 50. ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, LOOKING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 
119–30 (1996). 
 51. FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE 
CANT OF CONQUEST 111 (1975). 
 52. ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 50, at 99–119. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 50–61. 
 56. Id. 
 57. WILLIAM N. FENTON, THE GREAT LAW AND THE LONGHOUSE: A POLITICAL HISTORY 
OF THE IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY (1998). 
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First Nations followed and developed laws through treaty and 
agreement that guided their actions in their respective lands.  
When people from other continents arrived on the shores of North 
America, First Nations laws, protocols and procedures set the 
framework for the first treaties among Aboriginal peoples, and 
between Aboriginal peoples and the Dutch, French, British and 
Canadian Crowns.58 An interesting indigenous-to-indigenous treaty 
occurred between the Haudenosaunee and the Anishinabek in 1701 
near Sault St. Marie.59 The agreement was orally transacted and is 
recorded on a wampum belt (a mnemonic device with shells forming 
pictures sewn onto strings of animal hide and bound together).60 The 
1701 belt has an image of a “bowl with one spoon.”61 It references 
the fact that both nations would share their hunting grounds in order 
to obtain food. The single wooden spoon in the bowl meant that no 
knives or sharp edges would be allowed in the land, for this would 
lead to bloodshed.62 This agreement is still remembered by the two 
nations today.  
In the early days of contact, agreements between indigenous 
peoples and others often followed Aboriginal legal customs and 
traditions.63 In the early 1700s, the French entered into treaties with 
the Anishinabek of the Great Lakes by using Anishinabek forms, 
wampum belts and ceremony.64 From 1685 until 1779, the peace and 
friendship treaties between the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet, Passamaquody 
and the British Crown used similar principles grounded in indigenous 
protocols, procedures and practices.65 In 1764, when the British were 
 58. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY 
VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600–1800 (1997). 
 59. Victor Lytwyn, A Dish with One Spoon: The Shared Hunting Grounds Agreement in 
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Valley Region, in PAPERS OF THE 28TH ALGONQUIAN 
CONFERENCE 210–27 (David H. Pentland ed., 1997). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Paul Williams, Oral Tradition on Trial, in GIN DAS WINAN: DOCUMENTING 
ABORIGINAL HISTORY IN ONTARIO 29–34 (Dale Standen & David McNab eds., 1996). 
 63. ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 50, at 119–30. 
 64. RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE 
GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650–1815 (1991). 
 65. For a history, see generally THOMAS ISSAC, ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN THE 
MARITIMES: THE MARSHALL DECISION AND BEYOND (2001); WILLIAM C. WICKEN, MI’KMAQ 
TREATIES ON TRIAL: HISTORY, LAND, AND DONALD MARSHALL JUNIOR (2002). 
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able to assert an interest in North America after the Seven Years War, 
they used indigenous legal traditions to transact business and bind 
themselves to solemn commitments.66 Since that time, there have 
been over 500 treaties in Canada, with many of them drawing on 
some form of indigenous legal tradition, even in later eras when 
Aboriginal peoples enjoyed less political influence. First Nations 
laws, legal perspectives and other indigenous frameworks have been 
present throughout the entire span of the treaty-making process in 
Canada.67 Since 1982, existing treaty rights have been recognized and 
affirmed by the Constitution, thus enjoying the highest possible status 
in Canada’s legal order. The continuation of treaty rights and 
obligations entrenches the continued existence of indigenous legal 
traditions in Canada.  
Treaties are not the only area in which indigenous traditions have 
influenced the development of law in Canada, continuing into the 
present day. From the 1500s onward, many European individuals 
submitted themselves to indigenous legal orders. For example, many 
traders and explorers adopted indigenous legal traditions and 
participated in their laws.68 A perusal of the fur trade literature 
reveals that commercial transactions were often conducted in 
accordance with indigenous traditions.69 The giving of gifts, the 
extension of credit, and the standards of trade were often based on 
indigenous legal concepts.70 In the more personal sphere, many of the 
early marriage relationships between indigenous women and 
 66. John Borrows, Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal 
History, and Self-Government, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN CANADA 155 (Michael 
Asch ed., 1997). 
 67. ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, PARTNERS IN CONFEDERATION: 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 8, 20 (1993). 
 68. WHITE, supra note 64, at 94–114. 
 69. Lynda Gullason, “No Less Than 7 Different Nations”: Ethnicity and Culture Contact 
at Fort George-Buckingham House, in THE FUR TRADE REVISITED: SELECTED PAPERS OF THE 
SIXTH NORTH AMERICAN FUR TRADE CONFERENCE, MACKINAC ISLAND, MICHIGAN, 1991, at 
117, 117–42 (Jennifer S.H. Brown et al. eds., 1994). 
 70. VICTOR P. LYTWYN, MUSKEKOWUCK ATHINUWICK: ORIGINAL PEOPLE OF THE 
GREAT SWAMPY LAND (2002); ARTHUR J. RAY & DONALD B. FREEMAN, “GIVE US GOOD 
MEASURE”: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INDIANS AND THE 
HUDSON’S BAY COMPANY BEFORE 1763, at 231–60, 285 (1978); PAUL C. THISTLE, INDIAN-
EUROPEAN TRADE RELATIONS IN THE LOWER SASKATCHEWAN RIVER REGION TO 1840, at 33–
50 (1986). 
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European men were formed according to indigenous legal 
traditions.71 There were no priests or ministers in the Northwest to 
officiate at weddings until 1818, and this meant that governing laws 
were found in the various indigenous nations throughout the land.72 
For example, in the first year of Canada’s confederation, the 
Quebec Superior Court affirmed the existence of Cree law on the 
Prairies and recognized it as part of the common law.73 In arriving at 
this position, Justice Monk wrote: 
Will it be contended that the territorial rights, political 
organization such as it was, or the laws and usages of Indian 
tribes were abrogated—that they ceased to exist when these 
two European nations began to trade with [A]boriginal 
occupants? In my opinion it is beyond controversy that they 
did not—that so far from being abolished, they were left in full 
force, and were not even modified in the slightest degree . . . .74 
This legal doctrine is known as the doctrine of continuity.75 While 
the original application of the common law in Canada was 
problematic, it did recognize the continuity of aboriginal customs, 
laws and traditions upon the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty. In R v. 
Mitchell, Chief Justice McLachlin wrote for a majority of the Court: 
“European settlement did not terminate the interests of aboriginal 
peoples arising from their historical occupation and use of the land. 
 71. SYLVIA VAN KIRK, “MANY TENDER TIES”: WOMEN IN FUR-TRADE SOCIETY IN 
WESTERN CANADA, 1670–1870 (1980). 
 72. Daniel Harmon’s journal describes such a fur trade wedding in December of 1801:  
Payet one of my Interpreters, has taken one of the Natives Daughters for a Wife, and to 
her Parents he gave in Rum & dry Goods &c. to the value of two hundred Dollars, and 
all the cerimonies attending such circumstances are that when it becomes time to 
retire, the Husband or rather Bridegroom (for as yet they are not joined by any bonds) 
shews his Bride where his Bed is, and then they, of course, both go to rest together, 
and so they continue to do as long as they can agree among themselves, but when 
either is displeased with their choice, he or she will seek another Partner . . . which is 
law here . . . .  
SIXTEEN YEARS IN THE INDIAN COUNTRY: THE JOURNAL OF DANIEL WILLIAMS HARMON, 
1800–1816, at 52–53 (W. Kaye Lamb ed., 1957).  
 73. Connolly v. Woolrich, [1867] 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (Quebec Sup. Ct.), aff’d, Johnstone v. 
Connelly, [1869] 17 R.J.R.Q. 266 (Quebec Q.B.). 
 74. Id. at 79. 
 75. ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 67, at 19. 
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To the contrary, aboriginal interests and customary laws were 
presumed to survive the assertion of sovereignty, and were absorbed 
into the common law as rights. . . .”76 
Indigenous legal traditions continued to exist in Canada unless, as 
Chief Justice McLachlin wrote: “(1) they were incompatible with the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, (2) they were surrendered 
voluntarily via the treaty process, or (3) the government extinguished 
them.”77 Barring one of these exceptions, the practices, customs and 
traditions that defined the various aboriginal societies as distinctive 
cultures continue as part of the law of Canada today.78 If 
reconciliation is the lens through which the courts interpret the 
parties’ relationships,79 there are sound arguments that Aboriginal 
governance is compatible with the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, 
that it was not surrendered by treaties, and that it was not 
extinguished by clear and plain government legislation. 
One can also over-emphasize the positivistic nature of non-
indigenous legal traditions.80 The Supreme Court said that while 
Canada’s constitution is “primarily a written one . . . [b]ehind the 
written word is an historical lineage stretching back through the ages, 
which aids in the consideration of the underlying constitutional 
principles. These principles inform and sustain the constitutional text: 
they are the vital unstated assumptions upon which the text is 
based.”81 The Court further noted that these unwritten principles are 
 76. R v. Mitchell, [2001] S.C.R. 911, 927. 
 77. Id.; see B. Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, 66 CAN. BAR REV. 727 (1987). 
 78. See Calder v. Attorney Gen. of B.C., [1973] S.C.R. 313; Mabo v. Queensland II 
(1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 57 (Brennan, J.), 81–82 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ.), 182–83 (Toohey, J.). 
 79. See R v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.R. 507, 539.  
More specifically, what s. 35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through 
which the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own 
practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty 
of the Crown. The substantive rights which fall within the provision must be defined in 
light of this purpose; the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be 
directed towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the 
sovereignty of the Crown. 
Id. 
 80. See Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, The Quebec Secession Reference and the 
Judicial Arbitration of Conflicting Narratives About Law, Democracy and Identity, 23 VT. L. 
REV. 793 (1999). 
 81. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217, 247.  
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“not merely descriptive but are also invested with a powerful 
normative force, and are binding upon both courts and 
governments.”82 The Constitution’s unwritten postulates “form the 
very foundation of the Constitution of Canada.”83 It is tempting to 
make broad, almost irreconcilable distinctions between Aboriginal legal 
traditions and western legal sources because of the different histories, 
social organization and values of the groups. This is why it is important 
to note that, much like indigenous legal traditions, Canada’s broader 
legal traditions also rest on an unwritten, customary base. 
If these similarities are not appreciated, the differences between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal legal systems can give rise to many 
misconceptions and stereotypes about Aboriginal traditions. The 
Supreme Court of Canada may have fallen into this trap when it 
reflected on the similarities and differences between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal traditions in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.84 Chief 
Justice Lamer observed:  
In the Aboriginal tradition the purposes of repeating oral 
accounts from the past is broader than role of the written 
history in western societies. It may be to educate the listener, 
to communicate aspects of culture, to socialize people into a 
cultural tradition, or to validate the claims of a particular 
family to authority and prestige. . . .85 
This description of the social role of Aboriginal oral histories is 
striking not because it is inaccurate—indeed, the Court was sensitive 
to the various roles these traditions can play—but because the Court 
seemed to overlook the broader social function of Canadian law 
generally. The “broad social role” of indigenous tradition, as the 
“expression of the values and mores” of culture is not very different 
from what occurs in the common law and civil law traditions.86 Yet, 
 82. Id. at 249. 
 83. Id. at 250 (quoting Re Man. Language Rights, [1985] S.C.R. 721, 752). 
 84. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.R. 1010. 
 85. Id. at 1068 (quoting REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 
(1996)). 
 86. Id. at 1068 (citing Clay McLeod, The Oral Histories of Canada’s Northern Peoples, 
Anglo-Canadian Evidence Law, and Canada’s Fiduciary Duty to First Nations: Breaking 
Down the Barriers of the Past, 30 ALTA. L. REV. 1276 (1992)). 
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by contrasting Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal traditions in a 
dichotomous manner, the Supreme Court did not give sufficient 
emphasis to the common or civil law’s broad social function. 
Stereotypes about indigenous law can be problematic because they 
neglect the civil and common law’s own role as a cultural medium that 
educates, communicates and socializes. They make indigenous 
principles and traditions appear overly subjective and “non-legal” 
because of their “broad social role.” It can be too easy to detach the civil 
and common law from their cultural contexts, especially when their 
cultural components seem almost invisible because they correspond 
with values a wide portion of society shares. A fair account of the 
similarities and differences between indigenous, civil and common law 
traditions would pay equal attention to the cultural aspects of each form 
of law. Canada’s two most dominant legal traditions, the civil and 
common law, also have deep cultural roots. 
A. Civil Law Legal Traditions 
Canada’s civil law legal tradition has its origin in Roman law and 
was originally codified in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian.87 It 
developed subsequently in Continental Europe and then spread 
around the world in codified and un-codified forms.88 Civil law is a 
highly structured tradition based on broad declarations of general 
principles that provide guidance to its adherents.89 It was first 
received in North America in the earliest days of New France when it 
became a royal province in 1663, more than a century before the 
French Revolution of 1789.90 Canada’s civil law originally derived 
from a decree by King Louis XIV that New France would follow the 
Custom of Paris, the body of laws that governed the region around 
Paris (Île de France) at the time.91 The centralized transplant of 
customs from one part of the world and their application to people in 
another part of the world, even if they did not necessarily share the 
 87. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law and Civil Law (Codified and 
Uncodified) (Part I), 4 UNIF. L. REV. 591, 596 (1999). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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same customs, is a feature of principle-based laws.92 The laws of 
New France demonstrate this pattern of direction from the top, as 
Royal ordinances and edicts and decisions from the Counseil 
Souverain (Sovereign Council) proclaimed the laws by which people 
would live.93 Fortunately, there was early recognition that law is not 
effective if it does not reflect some local values. In this recognition, it 
was implicitly acknowledged that the “top” of the social hierarchy 
has to interact with the “bottom” for law to be effective. Therefore, 
the Code went through several changes in 1667, 1678 and 1685 to 
reference the particular cultural circumstances of New France.94  
In 1763, the civil law was abolished as the legal system in New 
France after the conquest and the Treaty of Paris.95 The British 
common law system was imposed on the people of New France, 
though the civil law continued to exist in practice.96 It is interesting to 
note that even though the law was formally British, positivistic 
proclamations were insufficient to displace laws that had come to 
reflect more local values.97 The culture of local law was not easily 
erased. As a result, the British reinstated the civil law system in the 
Québec Act of 1774 because they recognized that the best way to 
secure order and a degree of allegiance was to allow people to live 
closer to their own customs and values.98 Since that date, the civil law 
has survived in Canada.  
For example, the Constitutional Act of 1791 split the province of 
Québec into Upper and Lower Canada and did not extinguish the 
civil law.99 While Upper Canada became a common law jurisdiction 
in that era, Lower Canada retained its civilian tradition.100 Close to 
fifty years later, another change occurred through the Act of Union of 
 92. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUTION TO THE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 12 (2d ed. 1985). 
 93. MÉLANIE BRUNET, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION IN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA, 1868–2000, at 5 (2000). 
 94. Tetley, supra note 87. 
 95. Id. 
 96. BRUNET, supra note 93, at 6. 
 97. QUEBEC CIVIL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO QUEBEC PRIVATE LAW 10–11, 13 (John 
E.C. Brierley & Roderick A. Macdonald eds., 1993). 
 98. W.J. ECCLES, FRANCE IN AMERICA 234 (1st ed. 1972). 
 99. QUEBEC CIVIL LAW, supra note 97, at 14. 
 100. Id. 
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1840.101 This placed Lower and Upper Canada in a political union; it 
did not modify civil law rights, but it did create unique pressures on 
this system. This resulted in the development of a bilingual civil code 
for Canada East (still called Lower Canada in its title) in 1857, and 
was intended to reconcile the problems that had developed from the 
mixing of British common law and the Custom of Paris.102 Note that 
the civil law in Canada was not codified before this initiative. In 
1866, the Civil Code of Lower Canada was enacted, which also drew 
inspiration from the 1804 Code Napoléon.103 The 1866 Code had four 
books governing its structure: Persons, Property and its Different 
Modifications, Acquisition and Exercise of Rights of Property, and 
Commercial Law.104 
Confederation also allowed for the continuation of the civil law in 
Canada. Section 92(13) of the BNA Act gave the provinces exclusive 
power over “property and civil rights,”105 continuing Quebec’s legal 
tradition under this head of power. In fact, the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada remained virtually unchanged from 1866 until 1955. In the 
late 1980s, it became apparent that a major revision of the Code was 
required. As a result, a new Civil Code of Québec came into force on 
February 1, 1994. The new Code contains ten books and integrates 
some concepts from the common law.106 
The interpretive tradition of the civil law emphasizes the primacy 
of broad principles and embodies deeper societal commitments. 
Professor Rod MacDonald wrote: “A civil code may be described as 
a social or civil constitution—a text documenting the compact 
between people by which fundamental terms of civil society are 
 101. Id. at 18. 
 102. Id. at 22. 
 103. Id. at 24. 
 104. Id. at 29. 
 105. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3 § 92(13) (U.K.). 
 106. The ten books of the Code include: (1) Persons (e.g.: basic individual rights, residence 
rules, privacy); (2) The Family (e.g.: marriage, parentage, adoption); (3) Successions (e.g.: 
wills, inheritance, estates); (4) Property (e.g.: possession, land boundaries, right-of-way); (5) 
Obligations (e.g.: contract law, civil liability (tort law), sales, leasing); (6) Hypothecs (i.e.: 
mortgages and the sale of land); (7) Evidence (e.g.: burden of proof, rules of evidence); (8) 
Prescription (i.e.: statutes of limitations); (9) Publication of Rights (e.g.: registration of 
property); (10) Private International Law (governs the resolution of legal issues involving 
persons outside of Canada). 
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established.”107 Thus, the civil law is a powerful legal tradition in 
Canada because of its historic use and its relationship to the societal 
culture in which it is applicable.  
B. Common Law Legal Traditions 
At the same time that the civil law grew in Canada, common law 
tradition also came to enjoy broad operation. Its origins were not 
grounded in any text, but developed from a tradition “expressed in 
action.”108 The common law began as customary law and was the 
product of a great diversity of cultures within medieval England. It 
grew out of a society where a bewildering diversity of courts, from a 
broad array of cultures, enforced a wide variety of law.109 Throughout 
the hills and hollows of England, there were courts of equity, market 
courts, manor courts, and university courts, along with county courts, 
borough courts, ecclesiastical courts and aristocratic courts, among 
others.110 
The common law’s story is its expansion at the expense of these 
other legal jurisdictions, through the use of writs.111 The great English 
historian F.W. Maitland observed that writs were “the means 
whereby justice [became] centralized, whereby the king’s court 
[drew] away business from other courts.”112 The common law in 
medieval England was a formulary system, developed around a 
complex of writs that a litigant could obtain from the Chancery to 
initiate litigation in the Royal Courts.113 Each writ gave rise to a 
specific manner of proceeding or form of action, and had its own 
 107. Roderick A. Macdonald, Encoding Canadian Civil Law, in DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., 
THE HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH QUEBEC CIVIL LAW AND CANADIAN 
BIJURALISM 135, 159 (1997). 
 108. SIMPSON, supra note 36. 
 109. MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 
39–43 (Legal Classics Library 1987) (1713); see H. Patrick Glenn, The Common Law in 
Canada, 74 CAN. BAR REV. 261, 265, 276 (1995). The cultural diversity in the development of 
the United Kingdom is nicely detailed in NORMAN DAVIES, THE ISLES: A HISTORY (1999). 
 110. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (2d ed. 1979). 
 111. See FREDERIC W. MAITLAND & FRANCIS C. MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH 
LEGAL HISTORY 1–130 (James F. Colby ed., 1915). 
 112. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 11 (2nd prtg. 
1948). 
 113. See MAITLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 111, at 100–01. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p167 Borrows book pages.doc  2/22/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 19:167 
 
 
 
particularized rules and procedures.114 These “forms of actions” were 
the procedural devices courts used to give expression to the theories 
of liability recognized by the common law.115 Through these writs, 
litigants elected their remedies in advance of trial, and they could not 
subsequently amend their pleadings to conform to the proof needed 
for the case or to meet the court’s choice of another theory of 
liability.116 If litigants did not select the proper writ for their action, 
they could not succeed in their claim.117 This uniformity allowed for 
the more centralized control of the entire common law structure,118 
and the sovereignty of the Crown expanded with the extension of the 
common law’s jurisdiction.119  
The common law was exported to Canada when English 
governors arrived on its shores and asserted its application to their 
new home. The date for the common law’s reception varies across the 
country.120 Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia followed the common law before Confederation, 
after the Acadian settlement and expulsion in the Maritimes.121 
Similarly, the colonies of Vancouver Island and British Columbia 
were also common law jurisdictions before union.122 Reception of the 
common law in what became Ontario is generally placed at 1763, 
while the prairies and the old North-west were deemed to receive the 
common law in 1870.123 It was not until 1849 that decisions and 
developments in English law were no longer directly incorporated 
into Canadian common law.124 Of course, many indigenous people 
wonder how these colonies became common law jurisdictions when 
indigenous legal traditions continued to apply. 
 114. See G.C. CHESHIRE ET AL., THE LAW OF CONTRACT 2 (11th ed. 1986). 
 115. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 663 (7th ed. 1999). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See POTTER’S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 
293–97 (A.K.R. Kiralfy ed., 4th ed. 1958). 
 118. See M.H. OGILVIE, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL STUDIES 70, 101, 106–07 
(1982). 
 119. See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 11–36 (2d ed. 
1981). 
 120. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 2-1 to 2-17 (1997). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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The common law tradition in contemporary Canada operates 
through stare decisis and a hierarchy of courts. Stare decisis is the 
principle that decisions in previous cases are applied to current cases 
which are materially similar, and in their decisions, judges are 
expected to provide reasons justifying their selection of applicable 
cases and principles.125 As noted, the doctrine of precedent was not 
originally a part of the common law method, but arose in the 
seventeenth century because of a need to have standardized rules with 
the development of industrialization.126 When following precedent, 
previous cases provide guidance and act as constraints on judges. It 
provides a measure of uniformity to the law and attempts to avoid 
arbitrariness in decision-making.127 
Another aspect of the common law that is now prevalent but was 
not originally a part of its operation is the hierarchy of courts. Lower 
court decisions can be appealed to higher courts, and the decisions of 
the higher or superior courts are binding on inferior tribunals.128 The 
Supreme Court of Canada is at the top of this hierarchy, with 
provincial Courts of Appeal below it, and trial courts below still.129 
Hierarchy also promotes uniformity and attempts to remove 
arbitrariness from Canada’s legal system.130 The common law’s 
culture is one of incremental development on a case-by-case basis. 
C. Indigenous Legal Traditions 
Laws can arise whenever human interactions create expectations 
about proper conduct. Indigenous legal traditions developed in this 
fashion and were based on the customs and practices of their 
people.131 Customary laws are inductive and are discerned by 
examining specific routines and procedures relating to conduct within 
a community.132 As noted, the laws of England operated largely 
 125. DIMENSIONS OF LAW: CANADIAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
53 (George Alexandrowicz et al. eds., 2004).  
 126. Glenn, supra note 109. 
 127. DIMENSIONS OF LAW, supra note 125, at 53. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See supra note 48. 
 131. DIMENSIONS OF LAW, supra note 125, at 53. 
 132. See supra note 48. 
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through custom until precedent and consolidation took place during 
the 1700s.133 Even today, the common law method uses customs and 
traditions to fill gaps when interpreting written rules.134 Indigenous 
legal traditions are best understood through the lens of customary 
law.  
Indigenous peoples in what is now Canada developed various 
spiritual, political and social customs and conventions to guide their 
relationships.135 These diverse customs and conventions became the 
foundation for many complex systems of law.136 Contemporary 
Canadian law concerning indigenous peoples partially originates in, 
and is extracted from, these legal systems.137 To ensure that important 
ideas are preserved, memory devices are an important part of these 
traditions.138 Memory devices can include wampum belts, masks, 
totem poles, medicine bundles, culturally modified trees, birch bark 
scrolls, petroglyphs, button blankets, land forms, crests, and more.139 
 133. Glenn, supra note 109, at 264. 
 134. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217. 
 135. A representative description of one culture’s (Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en) societal 
conventions is found in GISDAY WA & DELGAM UUKW, THE SPIRIT IN THE LAND (1992).  
 136. “The body of rules, whether proceeding from formal enactment or from custom, which a 
particular state or community recognizes as binding on its members or subjects.” OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 712 (2d ed. 1989). For additional comments on First Nations law, see INDIGENOUS 
LAW AND THE STATE (Bradford W. Morse & Gordon R. Woodman eds., 1987); Michael Coyle, 
Traditional Indian Justice in Ontario: A Role for the Present?, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 605 (1986). 
For a contrary view, see Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1991] 79 D.L.R. 4th 185, 447 (“[W]hat 
the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en witness[es] describe as law is really a most uncertain and highly 
flexible set of customs which are frequently not followed by the Indians themselves.”); Roger F. 
McDonnell, Contextualizing the Investigation of Customary Law in Contemporary Native 
Communities, 34 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 299 (1992). For criticism of this view, see Michael Asch, 
Errors in Delgamuukw: An Anthropological Perspective, in ABORIGINAL TITLE IN BRITISH 
COLUMBIA: DELGAMUUKW V. THE QUEEN 221 (Frank Cassidy ed., 1992). For a fuller 
description of Wet’suwet’en law, see MILLS, supra note 48. 
 137. For cases involving the reception of First Nations law into Canadian law, see 
Connolly v. Woolrich, [1867] R.J.R.Q. 75 (Quebec Sup. Ct.), aff’d, Johnstone v. Connelly, 
[1869] R.J.R.Q. 266 (Quebec Q.B.); R v. Nan-e-quis-a Ka, [1889] Terr. L.R. 211 (N.W.T.S.C.); 
R v. Bear’s Shin Bone, [1899] Terr. L.R. 173 (N.W.T.S.C.); Re Noah Estate, [1961] D.L.R. 
(2d) 185; Re Kitchooalik & Tucktoo, [1972] D.L.R. (3d) 483; Michell v. Dennis, [1984] 
W.W.R. 449 (B.C.S.C.); Casimel v. Ins. Corp. of B.C., [1992] C.N.L.R. 84 (B.C.S.C.); Vielle v. 
Vielle, [1993] C.N.L.R. 165 (Alta. Q.B.).  
 138. PENNY PETRONE, NATIVE LITERATURE IN CANADA: FROM ORAL TRADITION TO THE 
PRESENT 9–35 (1990). 
 139. Id. 
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Indigenous traditions are often recorded in oral form. Oral history 
in numerous indigenous groups is conveyed through interwoven 
layers of culture that entwine to sustain national memories over the 
lifetime of many generations. The transmission of traditions in these 
societies is bound with the configuration of language, political 
structures, kinship, clan, economic systems, social relations, 
intellectual methodologies, morality, ideology and their physical 
world.140 These factors assist people in knitting historic memories 
more tightly in their minds. There are many types of traditions that 
are a product of this process: memorized speech, historical gossip, 
personal reminiscences, formalized group accounts, representations 
of origins and genesis, genealogies, epics, tales, proverbs and 
sayings.141 
Indigenous legal traditions also often rely upon elders or 
sanctioned wisdom keepers to identify and communicate law.142 In 
their aggregation, each of these cultural strands are wound together 
and reinforced by specific practices. These practices include such 
complex customs as pre-hearing preparations, mnemonic devices, 
ceremonial repetition, the appointment of witnesses, dances, feasts, 
songs, poems, the use of testing, and the use and importance of place 
and geographic space to help ensure that certain traditions are 
accredited within the community.143 Oral tradition does not stand 
alone, but is given meaning through the context of the larger cultural 
experiences that surround it. 
As noted, indigenous legal traditions sometimes find their 
articulation in ceremony.144 Ceremonies often consist of formalized 
rituals that enable participants to directly participate in law.145 Each 
group created its own distinctive ceremonies and formalities to 
renew, celebrate, transfer or abandon legal relationships.146 As such, 
the ceremonies of the Potlatch on the west coast produced entirely 
 140. Id. 
 141. JAN VANSINA, ORAL TRADITION AS HISTORY 13–27 (1985). 
 142. JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS LAW 16, 
91 (2002). 
 143. Id. at 90. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 89–90. 
 146. Id.  
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different legal relationships from those of the Sundance on the 
prairies, or the Midewiwin and False Face societies of central 
Canada. The stories told in the Big Houses of the Salish 
fundamentally differ from those told in the teepees of the 
Assinaboine, and these could be very different again from those 
spoken in the longhouses of the Haudenosaunee, or in the lodges of 
the Mi’kmaq. Some ceremonies required special initiation in order to 
participate, thus creating a realm of sacred knowledge within some 
traditions.147 Each group’s ceremonies and stories varied according to 
its history, material circumstances, spiritual alignment and social 
structure.148  
Whatever the source and structure of indigenous legal tradition, 
the important point is that they rely less on centralized proclamation 
and enforcement than Canada’s other legal traditions. Indigenous 
legal traditions, like all legal traditions, require a translation 
process.149 Law is “a culture of argument”150 that “provide[s] a place 
and a set of institutions and methods where this conversational 
process can go on, as well as a second conversation by which the first 
is criticized and judged.”151  
Canada’s civil and common law traditions are also embedded in a 
culture of argument. Each tradition contains a degree of ambiguity 
that requires judgment and application beyond its initial formulation. 
Judges and lawyers interpret the civil and common law through case 
law judgments. Parliament and legislatures promulgate administrative 
regulations to further implement and clarify statutory grants of 
power. Indigenous traditions also require further explication beyond 
bare practice and presentation in order to understand and apply their 
meaning. 
Canadians are largely familiar with the process of resolving 
ambiguities in civil and common law traditions through judicial 
decision-making and executive regulation-making. They may be much 
less familiar with how ambiguities are addressed in indigenous legal 
 147. Id. at 3–4. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND 
LEGAL CRITICISM (1990). 
 150. Id. at xiii. 
 151. Id. at 80. 
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traditions. In trying to present a general picture of how these 
ambiguities are worked out, one is presented with a particular 
challenge; there are many indigenous legal traditions and each might 
possess a different method of interpretation. The best way to understand 
how to overcome ambiguity within an indigenous tradition is to become 
familiar with that system’s contours. It can be difficult to communicate 
how ambiguities should be overcome. Nevertheless, some idea of how 
indigenous peoples might engage in the process of interpretation within 
their traditions can be conveyed. The following story is indicative of the 
general methodology one must follow to interpret and apply indigenous 
laws. 
IN THE TIME BEFORE there were human beings on Earth, 
the Creator called a great meeting of the Animal People. 
During that period of the world’s history, the Animal People 
lived harmoniously with one another and could speak to the 
Creator with one mind. They were very curious about the 
reason for the gathering. When they had all assembled 
together, the Creator spoke. 
“I am sending a strange new creature to live among you,” he 
told the Animal People. “He is to be called Man and he is to be 
your brother. 
“But unlike you he will have no fur on his body, will walk on 
two legs and will not be able to speak with you. Because of 
this he will need your help in order to survive and become who 
I am creating him to be. You will need to be more than 
brothers and sisters, you will need to be his teachers. 
“Man will not be like you. He will not come into the world like 
you. He will not be born knowing and understanding who and 
what he is. He will have to search for that. And it is in the 
search that he will find himself. 
“He will also have a tremendous gift that you do not have. He 
will have the ability to dream. With this ability he will be able 
to invent great things and because of this he will move further 
and further away from you and will need your help even more 
when this happens. 
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“But to help him I am going to send him out into the world 
with one very special gift. I am going to give him the gift of 
the knowledge of Truth and Justice. But like his identity it 
must be a search, because if he finds this knowledge too easily 
he will take it for granted. So I am going to hide it and I need 
your help to find a good hiding-place. That is why I have 
called you here.” 
A great murmur ran through the crowd of Animal People. 
They were excited at the prospect of welcoming a new creature 
into the world and they were honoured by the Creator’s request 
for their help. This was truly an important day. 
One by one the Animal People came forward with suggestions 
of where the Creator should hide the gift of knowledge of 
Truth and Justice. 
“Give it to me, my Creator,” said the Buffalo, “and I will carry 
it on my hump to the very centre of the plains and bury it 
there.” 
“A good idea, my brother,” the Creator said, “but it is destined 
that Man should cover most of the world and he would find it 
there too easily and take it for granted.” 
“Then give it to me,” said the Salmon, “and I will carry it in 
my mouth to the deepest part of the ocean and I will hide it 
there.” 
“Another excellent idea,” said the Creator, “but it is destined 
that with his power to dream, Man will invent a device that 
will carry him there and he would find it too easily and take it 
for granted.” 
“Then I will take it,” said the Eagle, “and carry it in my talons 
and fly to the very face of the Moon and hide it there.” 
“No, my brother,” said the Creator, “even there he would find 
it too easily because Man will one day travel there as well.” 
Animal after animal came forward with marvellous 
suggestions on where to hide this precious gift, and one by one 
the Creator turned down their ideas. Finally, just when 
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discouragement was about to invade their circle, a tiny voice 
spoke from the back of the gathering. The Animal People were 
all surprised to find that the voice belonged to the Mole. 
The Mole was a small creature who spent his life tunnelling 
through the earth and because of this had lost most of the use 
of his eyes. Yet because he was always in touch with Mother 
Earth, the Mole had developed true spiritual insight. 
The Animal People listened respectfully when Mole began to 
speak. 
“I know where to hide it, my Creator,” he said. “I know where 
to hide the gift of the knowledge of Truth and Justice.” 
“Where then, my brother?” asked the Creator. “Where should I 
hide this gift?” 
“Put it inside them,” said the Mole. “Put it inside them because 
then only the wisest and purest of heart will have the courage 
to look there.” 
And that is where the Creator placed the gift of the knowledge 
of Truth and Justice.152 
This story teaches the importance of participation in the 
interpretation of indigenous legal traditions. The power of 
interpretation and judgment is not vested solely in “greater” beings, 
such as the Creator or powerful animals. As this story indicates, even 
the smallest animals might have something to contribute to a decision 
or to the resolution of an issue. If we analogized this story to 
contemporary indigenous traditions, we would conclude that all 
powers of interpretation and judgment should not be vested in 
legislators or judges. Those in society with less formal power also 
have a role in deciding how customs and practices should apply to 
them. Decision-making in indigenous communities should not 
necessarily occur through those who are distant, professionalized and 
impersonal; indigenous dispute resolution has the potential to involve 
 152. Based on a story by Phil Lane, Jr., Four Worlds Development, University of 
Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, as retold by Richard Wagamese, in ROYAL COMMISSION ON 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, RESTRUCTURING THE RELATIONSHIP (1996). 
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a greater range of people in determining the consequences for 
actions. Dispute resolution following this model would enable 
indigenous people to take responsibility for their own actions, and 
simultaneously be accountable for them.153  
D. The Relationship of Canada’s Legal Traditions 
Indigenous legal traditions are an important source of legal 
guidance for Aboriginal peoples. For centuries, indigenous laws have 
assisted Aboriginal peoples in the resolution of their disputes.154 
Certain aspects of these traditions continue to guide indigenous 
communities in contemporary settings.155 However, these laws have 
often been ignored or overruled by non-indigenous laws. Their 
influence has thus been eroded within indigenous communities.156 
Yet, they embody precepts and practices that connect Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal Canadians to land in a way that is not always possible 
under the current administration of the common or civil law.  
For example, the common and civil law has often been applied in 
Canada to separate indigenous people from their lands and 
environments.157 This has occurred through the dispossession of the 
country’s original inhabitants, or through the doctrine of Crown title 
that underlies non-indigenous peoples’ land rights in Canada.158 On 
the other hand, indigenous peoples stories, ceremonies, teachings, 
customs and norms often flow from very specific ecological 
relationships, and are interwoven with the world around them.159 For 
example, the west coast Potlatch systems are dependent on the vast 
richness that flows into their specific territories with the return of the 
 153. For more perspective on narrative and the law, see Nancy L. Cook, Outside the 
Tradition: Literature as Legal Scholarship, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 116–39 (1994); Robert M. 
Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179, 182 (1985); 
Valerie Karno, Bringing Fiction to Justice: Including Individual Narrative in Judicial 
Opinions, 2 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 79 (1990); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 
68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 385–86 (1989). 
 154. BORROWS, supra note 142. 
 155. Id. at 4. 
 156. Id. at 88. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 29–55. 
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salmon each year.160 This geographic fact facilitated the accumulation 
of material resources that became an important part of the give-away 
ceremony and feast that accompanied the Potlatch.161 Relationships 
of family law, the law of obligations, and property law hinged upon 
these connections to land and resources.162 The symbols of the 
Potlatch system also reflect the specific locale, as cedar bent boxes, 
house posts and big houses provided the setting and gifts that 
permitted the memorialization of west coast indigenous laws.163 
Similar observations about the connectedness of indigenous laws to 
land could be made for many other indigenous groups in Canada164 
and in other countries.165  
The continued existence of indigenous legal traditions could be of 
great benefit to indigenous peoples and to the wider public if they 
were given space to grow and develop. Canada has distinguished 
itself as a country that effectively operates with a bi-juridical 
tradition. There is much that can be learned and analogized from this 
experience in creating greater recognition for indigenous legal 
traditions in the country.  
 160. DONALD LELAND, ABORIGINAL SLAVERY ON THE NORTHWEST COAST OF NORTH 
AMERICA 1–6 (1997). 
 161. Id. at 1–3. 
 162. Id. at 5–6. 
 163. Id. 
 164. HAROLD CARDINAL & WALTER HILDEBRANDT, TREATY ELDERS OF SASKATCHEWAN: 
OUR DREAM IS THAT OUR PEOPLES WILL ONE DAY BE CLEARLY RECOGNIZED AS NATIONS 
(2000); FENTON, supra note 57; 2 INTERVIEWING INUIT ELDERS: PERSPECTIVES ON 
TRADITIONAL LAW (J. Oosten et al. eds., 2000); BASIL JOHNSTON, OJIBWAY CEREMONIES 
(1982); MILLS, supra note 48; ROBIN RIDINGTON, LITTLE BIT KNOW SOMETHING: STORIES IN 
A LANGUAGE OF ANTHROPOLOGY (1990); OUR TELLINGS: INTERIOR SALISH STORIES OF THE 
NLHA’KAPMX PEOPLE (Darwin Hanna & Mamie Henry eds., 1996). 
 165. See JUDITH BINNEY, REDEMPTIVE SONGS: A LIFE OF A NINETEENTH CENTURY MAORI 
LEADER TE KOATI ARIKIRANGI TE TURAKI (1997); GLUCKMAN, supra note 48; HOEBEL, supra 
note 48; ROGER M. KEESING, CUSTOM AND CONFRONTATION: THE KWAIO STRUGGLE FOR 
CULTURAL AUTONOMY (1992); MICHAEL KWÁIOLOA & BEN BURT, LIVING TRADITION: A 
CHANGING LIFE IN SOLOMON ISLANDS (1997); LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 48; ANNE 
SALMOND, BETWEEN WORLDS: EARLY EXCHANGES BETWEEN MAORI AND EUROPEANS, 1773–
1815 (1997); ANNE SALMOND, TWO WORLDS: FIRST MEETINGS BETWEEN MAORI AND 
EUROPEANS, 1642–1772 (1991); WESTERN APACHE RAIDING AND WARFARE (Keith H. Basso 
ed., 1971). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p167 Borrows book pages.doc  2/22/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
198 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 19:167 
 
 
 
II. ENTRENCHING MULTI-JURIDICALISM IN CANADA 
Recently, the concept of bi-juridicalism has been frequently 
referenced in Canada. This phrase “refers to a state of facts: the co-
existence of two contemporaneous legal systems in Canada.”166 
While the concept behind bi-juridicalism is fair, it is also problematic 
because it is under-inclusive. As has already been noted, numerous 
indigenous legal traditions continue to function in Canada in a 
systemically important way. Canada would better be described as 
multi-juridical or legally pluralistic. The issue of indigenous law 
requires a pluralistic approach to understanding relations between 
Canada’s legal traditions. This reminder should carry us beyond bi-
juridicalism to search for more accurate and complete ways of 
describing the state of Canada’s legal inheritance.  
There are numerous ways that Canada could recognize and 
develop indigenous legal traditions in its midst. For example, there 
could be a greater recognition of indigenous governments and dispute 
resolution bodies through the courts, parliament, legislatures, the 
executive, law societies and law schools. 
A. Indigenous Governments 
Indigenous communities could apply their legal traditions more 
explicitly in making decisions and resolving disputes, particularly in 
their management and regulatory systems. This would enable 
indigenous governments to become more fully accountable to their 
people and would allow their communities to become more self-
sufficient. It could create a stronger tradition of positivistic 
indigenous law to rest beside more customary traditions. Indigenous 
governments could play a greater role in recognizing structures that 
facilitate access to their own legal values. This could occur through 
the development of indigenous Constitutions or through the 
application of their other culturally appropriate legal traditions. The 
federal government could extend or amend its policies to support and 
 166. Marie-Claude Gervais, Harmonization and Dissonance: Language and Law in 
Canada and Europe, in BIJURALISM AND HARMONIZATION: GENESIS 10 (2001). 
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recognize indigenous governments in these matters, and pass 
governance recognition legislation. 
The Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states: 
“Indigenous peoples have a right to self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”167 While the Draft 
Declaration may not be finalized, and International laws do not 
generally define “peoples” who have a right of self-determination, 
self-determination nevertheless remains an important and widespread 
indigenous aspiration.  
In exercising the right of self-determination, indigenous peoples in 
Canada could act to freely determine their political, economic, social 
and cultural development by determining legal issues within their 
own communities in accordance with their own values. If they did 
this, the first line of protection for indigenous culture would occur 
through the operation and recognition of indigenous peoples’ own 
laws, legal systems, policies and protocols. This could be done in 
tribal courts, potlatches, feasts, councils, administrative agencies, or 
any other forum a group chooses to protect its culture. These 
institutions should flow from the specific cultures that wish to protect 
their ideas, objects and expressions.  
Indigenous peoples’ legal traditions would be more securely 
protected and would remain a living cultural force if they defined the 
parameters of such traditions within their cultural contexts.168 
Indigenous legal traditions are not frozen at some artificial moment in 
the past; they continually develop to meet the needs of each 
generation. No culture is free from so-called external 
“contaminating” pressures. Indigenous cultures are no exception, 
though one should be careful not to equate change in indigenous 
 167. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, reprinted in 
SHARON VENNE, OUR ELDERS UNDERSTAND OUR RIGHTS 205 app. 1 (1998). 
 168. For arguments that one can reconcile liberalism with cultural recognition, see JOSEPH 
H. CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION OF 
JUSTICE AS EVEN HANDEDNESS (2000); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A 
LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995); AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL 
JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (2001); Alan Brudner, The 
Liberal Duty to Recognize Cultures, 8 REV. CONST. STUD. 129 (2003). 
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cultures with the extinction of indigenous cultures.169 Something does 
not automatically become non-indigenous just because indigenous 
peoples adapt and adopt contemporary objects in their ideas and 
expressions. 
Indigenous peoples should draw upon their and other cultures’ 
best practices and procedures in the law-making powers. They should 
compare, contrast, accept and reject governmental and legal standards 
from many sources, including their own. Some might call this 
revisionist, and seek to undermine indigenous governance and law by 
the use of this label. Such a critique would be invidious. All law and 
governance is revisionist, as it must be continually re-interpreted and 
re-applied in each generation to remain relevant to changing 
conditions. Law would become unjust and irrelevant if it was not 
continually revised. Aboriginal governance and law is no different, 
and should not be held to higher standards. Stereotypes must be 
jettisoned that imply that Aboriginal peoples’ ancient governmental 
or legal traditions were uniformly savage or, alternatively romantic, 
that they existed in a state of continual harmony and peace. 
People must also reject ideas that hold that indigenous peoples 
lose their Aboriginality if they adopt contemporary codes of conduct. 
The authenticity of indigenous law and governance is not measured 
by how closely they mirror the perceived past, but by how consistent 
they are with the current ideas of their communities. All legal 
traditions possess past practices that are no longer acceptable in light 
of contemporary values. The Quebec Civil Code recently abandoned 
inequality between spouses, and added privacy rights, personality 
rights and (trust-like) patrimony of affection powers.170 The common 
law no longer sanctions trial by ordeal, trial by battle, sexual or racial 
discrimination and a hundred other human rights abuses.171 Likewise, 
indigenous legal traditions are the subject of continual revision to 
 169. For a critical discussion of how the Canadian judiciary has mischaracterized concepts 
of culture, see Michael Asch, The Judicial Conceptualization of Culture After Delgamuukw and 
Van der Peet, 5 REV. CONST. STUD. 119 (2000); Catherine Bell & Michael Asch, Challenging 
Assumptions: The Impact of Precedent in Aboriginal Rights Litigation, in ABORIGINAL AND 
TREATY RIGHTS IN CANADA, supra note 1, at 38. 
 170. QUEBEC CIVIL LAW, supra note 97, at 208, 305–31, 371–74. 
 171. LOUISE BÉLANGER-HARDY & ALINE GRENON, ÉLÉMENTS DE COMMON LAW: ET 
APERÇU COMPARATIF DU DROIT CIVIIL QUÉBÉCOIS 27, 57 (1997). 
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ensure compatibility with contemporary communities and 
consistency with human rights values.  
Indigenous legal traditions could become even stronger if 
indigenous systems were the default whenever management, regulatory 
or dispute resolution issues arose. Indigenous peoples could define their 
claims and resolve them in the “context” of their own living culture.172 
This would help to ensure that their legal traditions were not considered 
a relic of some long-lost, distant past, protected in a glass cage and 
treated as the heritage of mankind. It would free indigenous peoples 
from some of the stereotypes and domination they have encountered in 
maintaining their cultures. Placing the resolution of disputes in 
indigenous hands would help ensure that indigenous culture remains an 
evolving, dynamic power that sustains the community’s ongoing 
existence. One would quickly see they were neither savage nor saint-
like, but human, with all the frailties, foibles, flaws and faults, strengths, 
talents, gifts and genius found in other communities. 
Indigenous legal traditions could be recognized as existing 
Aboriginal and treaty rights under section 35(1) of the Constitution 
Act of 1982.173 This result may flow from the very wording of the 
section itself: “The existing [A]boriginal and treaty rights of the 
[A]boriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and 
affirmed.”174 If peoples’ of Aboriginal groups rights are an element of 
section 35, concepts relating to self-determination should more 
thoroughly permeate this provision’s interpretation. Aboriginal 
groups should be able to claim organizational rights as peoples. 
This is the point made by Professor Cathy Bell in a 1997 article 
about Métis rights.175 She observed that section 35 came out of an 
international context where there was “[g]rowing activity at the 
United Nations aimed at ending colonial domination [which] resulted 
 172. For an argument recounting the importance of indigenous peoples making their claims 
“in context,” see Rosemary Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing 
Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 249 
(1993). 
 173. Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. II, Canada 
Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched. B § 35(1) (U.K.). 
 174. Id. (emphasis added). 
 175. Catherine Bell, Metis Constitutional Rights in Section 35(1), 36 ALTA. L. REV. 180, 
189–92, 194–95 (1997). 
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in increased international pressure on nation states to recognize and 
protect the human rights of colonized peoples.”176 If section 35 was 
placed in this broader context and recognized as a provision aimed at 
eradicating unconstitutional colonial domination, then principles of 
Aboriginal governance may be recognized as an important part of our 
Constitution’s purpose of “protect[ing] and reconcil[ing] . . . the 
interests which arise from the fact that prior to the arrival of 
Europeans in North America aboriginal peoples lived on the land in 
distinctive societies, with their own practices, customs and 
traditions.”177 
 Indigenous peoples exercised powers of governance in what is 
now Canada prior to Crown assertions of sovereignty.178 In Calder v. 
A.G.B.C,179 Justice Judson wrote: “[T]he fact is that when the settlers 
came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying 
the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what 
Indian title means.”180 
Organization is essential to governance. People organize 
themselves through a set of understandings about what is appropriate 
or inappropriate in their day-to-day interactions. These 
understandings are given force through principle or custom and 
become the law through which actions are measured and sanctions or 
commendations made.181 The fact that Aboriginal peoples were 
“organized in societies” prior to the arrival of Europeans implies that 
Aboriginal legal traditions were an important element of their “pre-
contact” societies.182 It demonstrates that their power of self-
 176. Id. at 183. 
 177. R v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.R. 507, 548. 
 178. See R v. Sioui, [1990] S.C.R. 1025. Justice Lamer observed:  
The mother countries did everything in their power to secure the alliance of each 
Indian nation and to encourage nations allied with the enemy to change sides. When 
these efforts met with success, they were incorporated in treaties of alliance or 
neutrality. This clearly indicates that the Indian nations were regarded in their relations 
with the European nations which occupied North America as independent nations. 
Id. at 1053. 
 179. Calder v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313.  
 180. Id. at 320 (emphasis added). 
 181. Supra note 48. 
 182. The reserved rights theory of aboriginal governance is also consistent with the 
proposition articulated in R v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.R. 507:  
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organization pre-existed the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty and 
was in fact strong enough to hold rights to land. These governance 
and legal powers were not voluntarily surrendered by the Crown’s act 
of assertion.183 Indigenous peoples continued to exercise their powers 
of governance in many ways after the Crown’s assertion of 
sovereignty.184 As noted, these powers are evident in matters internal 
to their societies and in their external relationships with Canada 
through treaties, trade and conflict.185 
Indigenous peoples continue to live in organized societies in the 
present day. They are governed by ancient and contemporary 
customs, laws and traditions that give meaning and purpose to their 
lives,186 though there has been extensive regulation of these powers 
In my view, the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and affirmed by 
s. 35(1), because of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, 
aboriginal peoples were already here, living in communities on the land, and 
participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries. 
Id. at 538 (emphasis added).  
 183. However, it has been held that “discovery” diminished Indian rights to land. See, e.g., 
Guerin v. R, [1984] S.C.R. 335, 378. 
 184. The Supreme Court of Canada accepted the idea that Aboriginal governance was 
multifaceted, even after the assertion of sovereignty, in R v. Sioui, [1990] S.C.R. 1025: 
As the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court said in 1832 in Worcester v. 
State of Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), at pp. 548–49, about British policy 
towards the Indians in the mid-eighteenth century: 
Such was the policy of Great Britain towards the Indian nations inhabiting the territory 
from which she excluded all other Europeans; such her claims, and such her practical 
exposition of the charters she had granted: she considered them as nations capable of 
maintaining the relations of peace and war; of governing themselves, under her 
protection; and she made treaties with them, the obligation of which she 
acknowledged. 
. . . .  
This “generous” policy which the British chose to adopt also found expression in other 
areas. The British Crown recognized that the Indians had certain ownership rights over 
their land, it sought to establish trade with them which would rise above the level of 
exploitation and give them a fair return. It also allowed them autonomy in their 
internal affairs, intervening in this area as little as possible. 
Id. at 1053–55 (emphasis added). 
 185. John Borrows, A Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and First Nations Self-
Government, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 291 (1992). The Aboriginal peoples’ ability to exercise 
their powers of governance through the post-confederation period was demonstrated every time 
a First Nations signed a treaty.  
 186. See generally John Borrows, Stewardship and the First Nations Governance Act, 29 
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through instruments such as the Indian Act.187 Fortunately, as the 
Supreme Court noted in R v. Sparrow, “that the right is controlled in 
great detail by the regulations does not mean that the right is thereby 
extinguished.”188 
In R v. Van der Peet,189 the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
Aboriginal rights were those practices that were integral to 
Aboriginal peoples prior to the arrival of Europeans.190 R v. 
Pamajewon191 held that governance powers would be tested on the 
same standard the Court developed in R v. Van der Peet.192 There are 
strong arguments that Aboriginal governance was integral to the 
organization of the distinctive cultures of Aboriginal peoples 
throughout Canada prior to the arrival of Europeans.193 It remains so 
today. An indigenous society’s legal traditions are inseparable from 
its governance powers. Aboriginal governance is an independent 
legal right, not dependent for its existence on any grant of authority 
from the executive or legislative bodies in Canada.194 It is a pre-
existing right that vested in Aboriginal groups prior to the arrival of 
the common law in Canada.195 Indigenous governance enables these 
peoples to use their legal traditions to pass on important names, 
divide territories, host feasts, raise memorials, engage in trade, sign 
treaties, participate in conflict resolution, exercise rights, keep the 
peace, facilitate development, build alliances, hold property, resist 
encroachments, and so on.196 Indigenous legal traditions enabled 
QUEEN’S L.J. 103 (2003).  
187. R.S.C., ch. I-5 (1985). For example, First Nations exercise pre-existing governance 
powers through the Indian custom council system under the Indian Act. For a definition of band 
custom, see the Indian Act, § 2(1); see also Bigstone v. Big Eagle, [1993] C.N.L.R. 25 (Fed. 
Ct.).  
 188. [1990] S.C.R. 1075, 1097. See Borrows, A Geneology of Law, supra note 185, for an 
application of this principle in a specific community context. 
 189. R v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.R. 507. 
 190. Id. at 509. 
 191. R v. Pamajewon, [1996] S.C.R. 821. 
 192. Id. at 822–23. 
 193. For the test used to prove Aboriginal rights, see Van Der Peet, [1996] S.C.R. at 511. 
 194. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.  
 195. R v. Guerin, [1984] S.C.R. 335, 378. 
 196. Supra note 48. 
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these peoples “when the settlers came [to be] organized in societies 
and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries.”197  
The federal government has already recognized that Aboriginal 
peoples possess unextinguished inherent rights to govern themselves. 
A policy statement issued in 1995 stated:  
The Government of Canada recognizes the inherent right of 
self-government as an existing right within section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 . . . Recognition of the inherent right is 
based on the view that the Aboriginal peoples of Canada have 
the right to govern themselves in relation to matters that are 
internal to their communities, integral to their unique cultures, 
identities, traditions, languages and institutions, and with 
respect to their special relationship to their land and their 
resources.198 
Note how these categories implicate indigenous legal traditions. 
Indigenous peoples’ ability to implement and develop laws, internal 
to their communities and integral to their cultures, could be 
considered within the scope of the federal policy. The federal policy 
should be broadened to recognize this fact. Aboriginal peoples’ rights 
to live by their laws are a matter integral to the unique cultures, 
identities, languages, institutions and relationship with land. Several 
observations: 
• Indigenous culture is preserved and adapts through legal 
tradition.  
• Indigenous identity is developed and passed on through 
indigenous law.  
• Indigenous languages embody indigenous juridical 
approaches in their very structure and organization.  
 197. Calder v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 328; see also Van Der Peet, [1996] 
S.C.R. at 538 (“[W]hen Europeans arrived . . . aboriginal peoples were already here [in British 
Columbia], living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as they 
had done for centuries.”). 
 198. INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS CAN., FEDERAL POLICY GUIDE, ABORIGINAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT: THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA’S APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
INHERENT RIGHT AND THE NEGOTIATION OF ABORIGINAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (1995), 
available at http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy_e.html. 
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• Indigenous institutions are held together by indigenous 
custom and law. 
• Indigenous peoples relationships with lands and resources 
stems from their legal traditions. 
These observations should make it clear that indigenous 
governance rests on indigenous legal tradition. It is an existing 
Aboriginal right in Canada, recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982.199 Aboriginal peoples have the right to 
implement their unique laws integral to their cultures, identities, 
traditions, languages and institutions, and with respect to their special 
relationship to their land and their resources. The 1995 Inherent 
Rights Policy should be amended or extended to recognize this fact. 
Aboriginal governments should strengthen their existing laws by 
acknowledging them as a source of their power, and should review 
and harmonize them with their legal traditions. 
Furthermore, the federal government, with the participation and 
joint development of indigenous governments, could modify and 
implement the recommendations of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples, which proposed an Aboriginal Nations 
Recognition and Government Act.200 If implemented, this Act would: 
 199. Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, Constitution Act, 1982, pt. II, Canada 
Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched. B § 35(1) (U.K.).  
 200. RESTRUCTURING THE RELATIONSHIP, supra note 152, at 1042. The Royal 
Commission also recommended that the Recognition Act: 
(a) establish the process whereby the government of Canada can recognize the 
accession of an Aboriginal group or groups to nation status and its assumption of 
authority as an Aboriginal government to exercise its inherent self-governing 
jurisdiction;  
(b) establish criteria for the re-recognition of Aboriginal nations, including  
(i) evidence among the communities concerned of common ties of language, history, 
culture and of willingness to associate, coupled with sufficient size to support the 
exercise of a broad, self-governing mandate;  
(ii) evidence of a fair and open process for obtaining the agreement of its citizens and 
member communities to embark on a nation recognition process;  
(iii) completion of a citizenship code that is consistent with international norms of 
human rights and with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;  
(iv) evidence that an impartial appeal process had been established by the nation to 
hear disputes about individuals’ eligibility for citizenship;  
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(a) [E]nable the federal government to vacate its legislative 
authority under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 
with respect to core powers deemed needed by Aboriginal 
nations and to specify which additional areas of federal 
jurisdiction the Parliament of Canada is prepared to 
acknowledge as being core powers to be exercised by 
Aboriginal governments; and  
(b) provide enhanced financial resources to enable recognized 
Aboriginal nations to exercise expanded governing powers for 
an increased population base in the period between recognition 
and the conclusion or reaffirmation of comprehensive 
treaties.201 
(v) evidence that a fundamental law or constitution has been drawn up through wide 
consultation with its citizens; and  
(vi) evidence that all citizens of the nation were permitted, through a fair means of 
expressing their opinion, to ratify the proposed constitution;  
(c) authorize the creation of recognition panels under the aegis of the proposed 
Aboriginal Lands and Treaties Tribunal to advise the government of Canada on 
whether a group meets recognition criteria;  
Id. This paper does not support the above recommendations in the form suggested by the Royal 
Commission because they could be used to remove recognition from indigenous governments 
currently enjoying power within Canada. The burden of proof is on Aboriginal governments, 
which have fewer resources and less support in the wider population than does the federal 
government. This could lead to the termination of First Nations, Metis and Inuit communities 
already recognized by the federal or provincial governments. 
 201. Id. The Royal Commission also recommended the creation of a Canada-wide 
framework agreement to guide the development of subsequent treaties and self-government 
agreements between recognized Aboriginal nations and the federal and provincial governments. 
The Commission wrote: 
The framework discussions should have three primary purposes: to achieve agreement 
on the areas of Aboriginal self-governing jurisdiction; to provide a policy framework 
for fiscal arrangements to support the exercise of such jurisdiction; and to establish 
principles to govern negotiations on lands and resources and on agreements for interim 
relief with respect to lands subject to claims, to take effect before the negotiation of 
treaties. 
Id. 
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B. Indigenous Courts and Dispute Resolution Bodies 
Indigenous governments should recognize and/or recreate 
institutions to exercise dispute resolution powers over matters 
internal to their communities. Indigenous governments should affirm 
the powers of these institutions in a manner consistent with their legal 
traditions. Law must embrace a community’s deeper normative values 
to be a just and effective force in facilitating peace and order. 
In Reference Re Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court of 
Canada considered the constitutionality of a unilateral declaration of 
sovereignty by Quebec.202 In deciding the issue, the Court made some 
important observations about the principles upon which the Canadian 
legal order rests, which have application to indigenous legal 
traditions. The Court wrote that “[t]o be accorded legitimacy, 
democratic institutions must rest, ultimately, on a legal foundation. 
That is, they must allow for the participation of, and accountability 
to, the people, through public institutions created under the 
Constitution.”203 Non-indigenous legal traditions do not sufficiently 
engage indigenous values and thus do not encourage indigenous 
participation. Indigenous adjudicative institutions using indigenous 
principles would correct this oversight. By and large, the current 
structures frustrate the participation of Indian people in Canada’s 
constitutional structure. They falsely rest on public institutions 
(Indian Act and other non-indigenous bodies under federal creation 
and delegated and ministerial authority) that are largely inconsistent 
with the Constitution of the country because they constrain 
Aboriginal rights to exercise decision-making power under section 
35. 
Indigenous governance would enjoy greater accountability and 
legitimacy if their own institutions were able to resolve their disputes. 
The power of Aboriginal people to judge and hold their own 
members accountable for their actions is an Aboriginal right that was 
integral to First Nations communities prior to the arrival of 
Europeans. Further, this right has not been extinguished, and can be 
 202. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217, 217–18. 
 203. Id. at 256. 
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exercised in a contemporary form.204 What must be recognized is the 
power of Aboriginal peoples under section 35 of the Constitution Act 
to sit in judgment over their own citizens when issues of rights, 
responsibility and accountability are raised. They will be in the best 
position to articulate legal principles that will have the deepest 
meaning and legitimacy in their communities.  
Such an approach would be consistent with indigenous legal 
values, as well as with more general principles of Canadian 
constitutional law. Ultimately, accountability within indigenous 
communities must flow from “principles of constitutionalism and the 
rule of law [that] lie at the root of our system of government.”205 
Protection and facilitation of the rule of law for Aboriginal peoples, 
as the Secession of Quebec case suggests, “requires the creation and 
maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which preserves and 
embodies the more general principle of normative order.”206 Judging 
indigenous people against norms that flow from within their legal 
traditions is essential to the facilitation of normative order. It would 
create a regime where legality and legitimacy coincide, bolstering the 
respect and effectiveness of regimes of accountability within 
communities.207 Failure to permit indigenous people to be governed 
and judged by principles that flow from their own normative 
prescriptions has not vouched-safe for indigenous peoples and “a 
stable, predicable and ordered society in which to conduct their 
affairs.”208  
In the United States, independent tribal courts have been an 
important force in holding the leadership of Indian communities to the 
highest standards of accountability, in accordance with broader 
principles of stewardship. While the organization of tribal courts was 
initially suspect because of their heavy reliance on the Bureau of Indian 
 204. These criteria come from the Supreme Court’s test in R v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.R. 
507. 
 205. Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. at 257. 
 206. Id. at 258 (quoting Re Man. Language Rights Reference, [1985] S.C.R. 721, 749). 
 207. “Our law’s claim to legitimacy also rests on an appeal to moral values, many of which 
are embedded in our constitutional structure. It would be a grave mistake to equate legitimacy 
with the “sovereign will” or majority rule alone, to the exclusion of other constitutional values.” 
Id. at 256. 
 208. Id. at 257.  
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Affairs to administer justice,209 in the last twenty-five years they have 
grown to become independent bodies capable of addressing the most 
challenging issues courts can face.210 
One particularly strong example of this power comes from the 
decision In Re Certified Question II: Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 
where the Navajo court was asked to consider, among other things, 
whether their tribal chairman had breached any fiduciary duties by 
receiving “bribes and kickbacks from contractors doing business with 
the Navajo Nation.”211 This case was significant for the Navajo courts 
because it asked them to solve their nation’s most pressing problem 
without resorting to external legal institutions. It squarely raised the 
issue of accountability in a context similar to those sometimes raised 
about certain indigenous leaders in Canada. As such, it is instructive to 
note the approach and result of the Navajo courts in this case.  
In MacDonald, the Navajo court drew upon “western” principles of 
law to articulate the fiduciary duty that a tribal executive officer owes to 
the members of the tribe.212 In so finding, it did that which any other 
court would have done. It examined general principles of law and 
applied them to the facts of the case to arrive at an appropriate solution. 
However, in finding that the chairman owed and violated fiduciary 
duties to the nation, the court referred to other legal norms that only it 
would be qualified to draw upon in facing this problem.213 In particular, 
the Navajo justices drew on Navajo common law to give meaning to the 
fiduciary duty in the context of principles of normative order within 
their communities.214 The court wrote of a story concerning two “Hero 
Twins” who slew monsters and overcame other troubles faced by the 
 209. See generally WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS IN 
ACCULTURATION AND CONTROL (1966); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 61–98 (1995). 
 210. See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian 
Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285 (1998). 
 211. In Re Certified Question II: Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 16 Indian L. Rep. (Am. 
Indian Law Training Program, Inc.) 6086 (Navajo S. Ct. 1989), reprinted in DAVID H. 
GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 533 (4th ed. 1998). 
 212. Id. at 429. 
 213. See Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of 
Custom in American Tribal Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 509 (1998). 
 214. Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225 
(1989). 
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Navajo at the time of their creation.215 The court held that this story 
embodied the “Navajo traditional concept of fiduciary trust of a leader 
(naat’aanii).”216 In applying the principles embedded in this story, the 
court wrote: 
After the epic battles were fought by the Hero Twins, the 
Navajo people set on the path of becoming a strong nation. It 
became necessary to elect naat’aaniis by consensus of the 
people. A naat’aanii was not a powerful politician nor was he 
a mighty chief. A naat’aanii was chosen based on his ability to 
help the people survive and whatever authority he had was 
based upon that ability and the trust placed in him by the 
people. If naat’aanii lost the trust of his people, the people 
simply ceased to follow him or even listen to his words. . . . 
The Navajo Tribal Council can place a Chairman or Vice 
Chairman on administrative leave if they have reasonable 
grounds to believe that the official seriously breached his 
fiduciary trust to the Navajo people. . . .217 
The court’s explanation of how the ancient story gave rise to 
fiduciary duties for a tribal chairman illustrates the relevance of First 
Nations law to contemporary indigenous jurisprudence. It enabled the 
Navajo to solve a pressing constitutional crisis in their nation 
concerning the accountability of its elected leaders by fitting general 
principles of stewardship to the specific realities of their community.  
In relating this example, I do not intend to propose an exact 
replication of U.S. tribal courts in a Canadian context, or to suggest 
that bands or communities should reorganize themselves along 
western political lines when dealing with separation of powers issues 
(though I think there are important lessons to be drawn from that 
experience).218 The problem indigenous peoples encounter in their 
current situations is the failure to address issues of normative order 
 215. GETCHES, supra note 211, at 430. 
 216. Id.  
 217. Id.  
 218. See WHAT CAN TRIBES DO? STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992). 
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within their communities through values that have persuasive 
meaning for them. 
The recognition of indigenous dispute resolution bodies and 
courts does not mean that Aboriginal peoples would have a separate 
system of justice in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada gave its 
approval for the recognition of difference as a mechanism to achieve 
equality in the case of Law v. Canada.219 Justice Iacobucci observed: 
[T]rue equality does not necessarily result from identical 
treatment. Formal distinctions in treatment will be necessary in 
some contexts in order to accommodate the differences 
between individuals and thus to produce equal treatment in a 
substantive sense . . . Correspondingly, a law which applies 
uniformly to all may still violate a claimant’s equality rights.220 
Just because a person is subject to differential treatment does not 
always mean that person is not receiving the equal benefit and 
protection of the law. As Justice Iacobucci observed, the notion of 
whether or not differential treatment is fair will always be a 
contextualized determination that depends on the right at issue, and 
the socio-economic status of that individual and of comparative 
groups. Applying these principles to the existence of indigenous legal 
traditions, one could also argue that differential treatment of 
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples do not necessarily raise 
concerns about inequality, fairness, or certainty.  
In further considering indigenous dispute resolution and the 
argument that it departs from the standard of one law for all 
Canadians, one should take into account that Canada is a federal 
system. There are ten provinces, three territories and one central 
government that create and enforce a variety of different legal rules 
throughout the country. Some of these laws even contradict one 
another. For example, some provinces permit state funded 
denominational schools, while others prohibit them.221 Some 
provinces are constitutionally obligated to fund religious schools, 
 219. [1999] S.C.R. 497. 
 220. Id. at 517. 
 221. Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] S.C.R. 1148. 
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while others have no such constraint.222 The fact that different, 
sometimes contradictory laws are passed by different legal regimes in 
Canada does not bring the legal system into disrepute. In fact, the 
respect it enjoys is heightened because the passage of different laws 
demonstrates a much-needed ability to respond to local 
circumstances. When one adds to this mix the idea that provincial 
governments each pass different regulations under identical federal 
laws when given the responsibility to administer such statutes, these 
variations are usually applauded because they allow legislators to be 
sensitive to purely local matters. Few would suggest that such 
provincial and regional variation is a departure from the principle of 
one law for all Canadians.223 
Finally, one might even consider that aside from pre-existing 
indigenous laws, Canada has long had other laws operating on its soil 
that do not emanate from central or provincial governments. As 
Geoff Hall pointed out in his article, there are many different legal 
regimes operating within the country.224 For instance, there are extra-
territorial applications of criminal law. Many countries have statutes 
that allow them to prosecute their citizens for crimes committed in 
another country.225 Canada has accepted this principle.226 Canada also 
recognizes the principle that tax obligations can be incurred to 
another country, even if one is working in Canada, depending upon 
the laws of one’s country of citizenship.227 In addition, diplomats 
possess immunity from the operation of domestic law, and the idea 
that countries can enjoy sovereign immunity is not an unfamiliar 
concept.228 Similarly, admiralty law and military law each 
contemplate extra-territorial application for their effective 
operation.229 
 222. Id. 
 223. James [Sákéj] Youngblood, Empowering Treaty Federalism, 58 SASK. L. REV. 241 
(1994). 
 224. Geoff R. Hall, The Quest for Native Self-Government: The Challenge of Territorial 
Sovereignty, 50 U. TORONTO L. REV. 39 (1992). 
 225. Id. at 45–48. 
 226. See Libman v. R, [1985] S.C.R. 179. 
 227. Hall, supra note 224, at 48–49. 
 228. Id. at 49–52. 
 229. Id. at 55–60. 
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The point of these examples is to show that sometimes the idea 
that Canadians live under one law is an overly simplistic view of how 
legal regimes interact within the country. Even the Criminal Code, a 
federal statute, is administered differently in each province.230 There 
is a great deal of variation between the provinces in their criminal law 
regimes, despite the common source of their laws.231 The argument 
that there should be one law for all does not communicate the 
multiplicity of laws necessary for the functioning of any society. The 
law in Canada unites uniformity with diversity. While it is 
appropriate to uphold the idea that this country’s laws (including 
indigenous laws) should be integrated, balanced and harmonized, it is 
inappropriate to hold the position that the law should be 
undifferentiated and that the exact same legal principles should apply 
to everyone in same manner. The existence of local, regional, 
provincial, common, civil, and indigenous legal traditions are better 
explained and protected by the realization that differential treatment 
might be the best mechanism for everyone living together under one 
law.232  
In this vein, Judge Turpel-Lafond’s advice of a few years ago 
seems particularly appropriate: 
We spent several years in a distracting debate over whether 
justice reform involves separate justice systems or reforming 
the mainstream justice system. This is a false dichotomy and 
fruitless distinction because it is not an either/or choice. The 
impetus for change can be better described as getting away 
from the colonialism and domination . . . Resisting colonialism 
means a reclaiming by Aboriginal Peoples of control of the 
resolution of disputes and jurisdiction over justice, but it is not 
as simple or as quick as that sounds. Moving in this direction 
will involve many linkages . . . and perhaps phased assumption 
of jurisdiction. For example, is there a community with the 
capacity to take on cases of individuals who have been charged 
with first-degree murder and are considered criminally insane 
 230. Id. at 45–48. 
 231. R v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.R. 1296, 1297. 
 232. See generally MACKLEM, supra note 1. 
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and violent? These are not problems that Aboriginal 
communities dealt with traditionally and it will take some time 
before such offenders can be streamed into an Aboriginal 
system (if ever). Communities may not want to or may not be 
ready to take on these kinds of cases.233 
C. Indigenous Law Recognition and Harmonization Acts 
In order to recognize and affirm indigenous legal traditions, the 
Federal Parliament should pass legislation recognizing indigenous 
laws on their own terms and create mechanisms to harmonize these 
laws with Canada’s other legal traditions. This legislation should be 
developed jointly with Aboriginal governments and organizations. 
This law should recognize the inherent rights of indigenous peoples 
to their legal traditions. It should also protect people and groups 
against discrimination in the operation of indigenous legal traditions. 
As such, the law should contain:  
• A clause providing that the Indigenous Law Recognition Act 
would not abrogate or derogate from any Aboriginal or treaty 
right under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982; 
• A clause stating that indigenous legal traditions must treat 
men and women equally, and that any indigenous legal 
traditions inconsistent with section 35(4) are of no force and 
effect; 
• A clause stating that indigenous legal traditions must be 
consistent with the provisions of the International 
Declaration of Human Rights to be binding on any person or 
group; 
 233. Mary Ellen Turpel, Reflections on Thinking About Criminal Justice Reform, in 
CONTINUING POUNDMAKER AND RIEL’S QUEST 206, 215 (Richard Gosse et al. eds., 1994); see 
also MATTHIAS R.J. LEONARDY, FIRST NATIONS CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN CANADA (1998); 
James Youngblood Henderson, Implementing Treaty Order, in CONTINUING POUNDMAKER 
AND RIEL’S QUEST, supra, at 52; Leonard Mandamin et al., The Criminal Code and Aboriginal 
People, U. B.C. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 5 (1992); Bruce H. Wildsmith, Treaty 
Responsibilities: A Co-relational Model, U. B.C. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 324 (1992). 
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• A clause noting that the Act would only come into force with 
the consent of an Aboriginal community and its government. 
Though it was never implemented, Australia’s Law Reform 
Commission proposed an Aboriginal Customary Law Recognition 
Act in its review of indigenous legal traditions in that country.234 
However, many other countries have laws recognizing indigenous 
legal traditions, such as many Pacific Island states,235 South Africa,236 
 234. LAW REFORM COMM’N (AUSTL.), REPORT NO. 31, THE RECOGNITION OF 
ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAWS (1986).  
 235. Other countries have created Recognition Acts for pre-existing systems of law. Some 
of the best examples of legislative recognition of indigenous legal traditions are found among 
the Pacific Island states. For example, the Cook Islands Act 1915 (N.Z.), section 422 states: 
“Every title to and interest in customary land shall be determined according to the ancient 
custom and usage of the natives of the Cook Islands.” The Constitution of Fiji 1990, section 
100(3) (until July 27, 1998) states: 
Until such time as an Act of Parliament otherwise provides, Fijian customary law shall 
have effect as part of the laws of Fiji: Provided that this subsection shall not apply in 
respect of any custom, tradition, usage or values that is, and to the extent that it is, 
inconsistent with a provision of this constitution or a statute, or repugnant to the 
general principles of humanity. 
The Laws of Kiribati Act 1989, section 4(2) states: “In addition to the Constitution, the Laws of 
Kiribati comprise—. . . (b) customary law . . . .” The Laws of Kiribati Act 1989, schedule 1, 
paragraph 2 also states: “[C]ustomary law shall be recognised and enforced by, and may be 
pleaded in, all courts except so far as in a particular case or in a particular context its 
recognition or enforcement would result, in the opinion of the court, in injustice or would not be 
in the public interest.” The Constitution of Marshall Islands 1978, article X, sections 1 and 2 
state: “Nothing in Article II shall be construed to invalidate the customary law or any traditional 
practice concerning land tenure or any related matter . . . . [I]t shall be the responsibility of the 
Nitijela . . . to declare, by Act, the customary law in the Marshall Islands.” The Constitution of 
Nauru 1968, section 81 states: “[T]he institutions, customs and usages of the Nauruans . . . shall 
be accorded recognition by every court, and have full force and effect of law” to regulate the 
matters specified in the Act. The Niue Act 1966, as amended by the Niue Amendment Act 
1968, section 23 states: “Every title to and estate or interest in Niuean land shall be determined 
according to Niuean custom and any Ordinance or other enactment affecting Niuean custom.” 
The Constitution of Samoa 1962, Article III(1) declares: “‘Law” . . . includes . . . any custom or 
usage which has acquired the force of law in Samoa . . . under the provisions of any Act or 
under a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.” The Constitution of Solomon Islands 
1978, section 76 and schedule 3, paragraph 3 enacts: “Subject to this paragraph, customary law 
shall have effect as part of the law of Solomon Islands.” The Tokelau Amendment Act 1996 
(N.Z.) preamble reads: “Traditional authority in Tokelau is vested in its villages, and the needs 
of Tokelau at a local level are generally met through the administration of customary practices 
by elders.” The Tokelau Amendment Act 1967 (N.Z.) section 20 states: “[T]he beneficial 
ownership of Tokelauan land shall be determined in accordance with the customs and usages of 
the Tokelauan inhabitants of Tokelau.” The preamble of the Constitution of Tuvalu 1986 and 
the Laws of Tuvalu Act 1987, section 4(2), dictate that: “In addition to the Constitution, the 
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Laws of Tuvalu comprise—. . . (b) customary law. . . .” In addition, the Laws of Tuvalu Act 
1987, schedule 1, paragraph 2 states: 
[C]ustomary law shall be recognised and enforced by, and may be pleaded in, all 
courts except so far as in a particular case or in a particular context its recognition or 
enforcement would result, in the opinion of the court, in injustice or would not be in 
the public interest. 
The Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, Article 47(1) states: “If there is no rule of law applicable to 
a matter before it, a court shall determine the matter according to substantial justice and 
whenever possible in conformity with custom.” In Joli v. Joli, the Vanuatu Court of Appeal 
found that there was no inconsistency between the English legislation and custom. Under a 
clause of the Vanuatu Constitution, the laws that applied at the day of Independence continue to 
apply unless the Parliament of Vanuatu has passed legislation on the subject matter. Those pre-
independence laws include laws of general application of England and France, provided, 
however, that the foreign laws pay sufficient regard to Vanuatu custom. An argument was 
raised that the English notions of dividing property and adjusting proprietary interests were 
inconsistent with the custom requirements for succession to land. The court disagreed, thus 
upholding indigenous law. The Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 
dictates: “(1) An Act of Parliament shall, (2) Until such time as an Act of Parliament provides 
otherwise—(a) the underlying law of Papua New Guinea shall be as prescribed . . . .” In 2000, 
Papua New Guinea passed the Underlying Law Act, which proclaims: 
The customary law shall apply unless: (a) it is inconsistent with a written law; or (b) 
its application and enforcement would be contrary to the National Goals and Directive 
Principles and the Basic Social Obligations established by the Constitution; or (c) its 
application and enforcement would be contrary to the basic rights guaranteed by 
Division III.3 (Basic Rights) of the Constitution.  
 236. South African laws recognize indigenous legal traditions. The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa affirms the continued applicability of traditional leadership and law, 
and upholds the courts’ and legislatures’ authority to recognize and apply that law. S. AFR. 
CONST. 1996. Sections 211 and 212 read: 
(1) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary 
law, are recognised, subject to the Constitution. (2) A traditional authority that 
observes a system of customary law may function subject to any applicable legislation 
and customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation or those 
customs. (3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject 
to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.  
(1) National legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership as an 
institution at local level on matters affecting local communities. (2) To deal with 
matters relating to traditional leadership, the role of traditional leaders, customary law 
and the customs of communities observing a system of customary law national or 
provincial legislation may provide for the establishment of houses of traditional 
leaders; and national legislation may establish a council of traditional leaders.  
Id. §§ 211–12. Courts and legislatures have followed this recognition. Community Courts and 
Courts for Chiefs and Headmen have jurisdiction to hear certain matters on the level of 
magistrates’ courts. They deal with customary disputes by an African against another African 
within a headman’s area of jurisdiction through an authorized African headman using 
indigenous law and custom. These courts are commonly known as chief’s courts. A person with 
a claim has the right to choose whether to bring a claim in the chief’s court or in a magistrate’s 
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Peru, Bolivia, Columbia, and Ghana. These laws could be examined 
to determine appropriate mechanisms to secure indigenous legal 
traditions while simultaneously protecting human rights.  
In addition to a Recognition Act, the Federal Parliament should 
pass legislation harmonizing indigenous legal traditions with other 
legal traditions in Canada. The Federal Law-Civil Law 
Harmonization Act, effective June 1, 2001, is the first in a series of 
Acts that will harmonize hundreds of federal statutes and 
regulations.237 This exercise is part of the Harmonization Program 
undertaken as a result of the coming into force of the Civil Code of 
Québec in 1994, which substantially changed the concepts, 
institutions and terminology of civil law. This Act states: 
8.1 Both the common law and the civil law are equally 
authoritative and recognized sources of the law of property and 
civil rights in Canada and, unless otherwise provided by law, if 
in interpreting an enactment it is necessary to refer to a 
province’s rules, principles or concepts forming part of the law 
of property and civil rights, reference must be made to the 
rules, principles and concepts in force in the province at the 
time the enactment is being applied.  
8.2 Unless otherwise provided by law, when an enactment 
contains both civil law and common law terminology, or 
terminology that has a different meaning in the civil law and 
the common law, the civil law terminology or meaning is to be 
adopted in the Province of Quebec and the common law 
terminology or meaning is to be adopted in the other 
provinces.238  
Principles and structures similar to those found for the 
harmonization of civil and common laws could be created for 
indigenous legal traditions. These could be regarded as an equally 
authoritative and necessary part of Canadian law. An Associate or 
court. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 became effective on 
November 15, 2000. It recognizes marriages negotiated, celebrated or concluded according to 
any of the systems of indigenous African customary law which exist in South Africa. 
 237. R.S.C., ch. 4 (2001). 
 238. Id. 
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Assistant Deputy Minister could be responsible for its administration, 
with resources comparable to those available for dealing with 
harmonization of the civil law in Canada.  
The harmonization process would have to deal with issues of 
protocol and the power imbalance that indigenous peoples will be 
concerned with in the identification and implementation of their legal 
traditions. Some of the issues that would have to be addressed by 
statute or regulations are: 
• The role of Elders;  
• Concerns about appropriation and culture property;  
• The impact of colonialism on certain indigenous laws;  
• The problem of gender stereotyping, discrimination or 
imbalance; and  
• The potential harms certain traditional laws could cause for 
vulnerable individuals within indigenous communities. 
It is important that indigenous legal traditions embrace 
contemporary human rights concerns. It is also important that human 
rights concerns do not become an excuse to further colonize 
indigenous societies. Human rights can be protected within 
indigenous communities without further extending the discriminatory 
practices and attitudes of earlier imperial policies. This is achieved 
best if indigenous peoples reformulate their traditions in a manner 
which respectfully integrates traditional and contemporary normative 
values and if the government secures protection and harmonization of 
these laws within the Canadian state. 
One of the distinctive features of Canadian law is the ability to 
work across legal traditions. The fuller recognition of indigenous 
legal traditions in Canada could give Canadians a degree of expertise 
in working with and assisting other countries that have mixed legal 
systems (civil, common and indigenous). Such expertise would allow 
Canadians to play an even greater role on the world stage as experts 
in multi-juridicalism. Further, such explicit plurality would provide 
an even greater range of sources to answer pressing questions faced 
by Canadians. As Canadians courts draw on the wisdom of many 
legal traditions, and compare and contrast them, they are more likely 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p167 Borrows book pages.doc  2/22/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
220 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 19:167 
 
 
 
to make decisions that accord with the normative values of their 
increasingly diverse population.  
D. Canadian and Indigenous Legal Institutional Development 
The recognition, implementation and harmonization of indigenous 
legal traditions would involve other Canadian legal institutions. 
Provincial law societies would play a role in facilitating indigenous 
legal traditions. In the United States, the recognition of indigenous 
legal traditions has led to the development and existence of 
indigenous law societies. The Indigenous Bar Association (IBA) 
could be developed to take on a governance role in accreditation or 
coordination of lawyers or other practitioners who may participate in 
indigenous legal systems. The IBA could be an educational and 
disciplinary body, as its members would have expertise with most 
indigenous groups in Canada. 
The further recognition and implementation of indigenous legal 
traditions would also create a greater role for indigenous legal 
education. The First Nations University of Canada and other 
indigenous educational institutions could work with indigenous 
leaders to develop programs specific to indigenous groups and their 
laws. The First Nations Governance Centre could provide valuable 
information and education as well. First Nations law schools or 
programs would facilitate the dissemination and acquisition of 
knowledge necessary to implement these traditions. There are 
numerous other societal initiatives that could be undertaken to 
support the dissemination and application of indigenous legal 
traditions throughout the country. 
CONCLUSION 
Canada’s balanced, and somewhat decentralized, federal state is 
one of the country’s great strengths. It facilitates the reconciliation of 
diversity with unity. It creates the potential for experimentation in the 
“social laboratory” that each constituent part of our federation 
encourages.239 More explicit recognition of indigenous legal 
 239. K.M. Lysyk, Reshaping Canadian Federalism, 13 U. B.C. L. REV. 1, 7 (1979). 
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traditions could lead to useful experimentation and innovation in 
solving many of Canada’s pressing problems. Furthermore, 
affirmation of indigenous legal traditions would strengthen 
democracy in the country by placing decision-making authority much 
closer to the people within these communities.240 Aboriginal peoples 
would be better served in Canada’s federation if they had the 
recognition and resources necessary to refine the law in accordance 
with their perspectives. This is important because central and 
provincial governments are more remote from Aboriginal peoples, 
both physically and culturally, and tend to be less responsive to the 
Aboriginal electorate than would their own governments exercising 
greater responsibility for their own affairs.241 Greater recognition of 
indigenous legal traditions could provide some counter-weight to the 
bi-culturalism and bi-elitism that sometimes infects Canada’s polity. 
The recognition of indigenous legal traditions in the Canadian 
state is bound to be contested and create difficulties in law and 
policy.242 Laws dealing with indigenous peoples must take account of 
the totality of cultural practices and expressions that belong to 
them.243 Recognizing and affirming indigenous legal traditions would 
facilitate the rule of law within indigenous communities as they lived 
closer to their values and principles. It would enable the exercise of 
greater responsibility for their affairs, and allow them to hold their 
governments and one another accountable for decisions made within 
their communities. If properly implemented and harmonized with 
Canada’s other legal traditions, such an approach would be consistent 
with their human rights as peoples while ensuring that other’s rights 
were not abrogated. Creating a national framework to facilitate the 
implementation of indigenous legal traditions would help to ensure 
Governments endowed “with both legislative jurisdiction and the wherewithal to exercise it 
[are] able to pioneer programmes which, if their worth is demonstrated, may commend 
themselves for adoption elsewhere in the country.” Id. 
 240. Id. at 8–9. “Another reason for guarding against undue centralization has to do with 
the desirability, in general, of keeping democratic decision-making as close as possible to the 
citizenry.” Id. 
 241. See Borrows, Stewardship and the First Nations Governance Act, supra note 186. 
 242. HEATHER MCRAE ET AL., INDIGENOUS LEGAL ISSUES: COMMENTARY AND 
MATERIALS 380 (2003). 
 243. TERRI JANKE, OUR CULTURE, OUR FUTURE: REPORT ON AUSTRALIAN INDIGENOUS 
CULTURAL AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 77–78 (1998). 
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that non-indigenous rights and interests are also respected. It is easier 
to envision fairer and more effective laws when rights are determined 
on more even playing field, with greater indigenous influence and 
participation.  
The proposals outlined in this paper are directed at creating laws 
and institutions that will find an appropriate balance between the 
interests of recognizing and respecting indigenous cultural, political, 
economic and social integrity and the interests of society as a 
whole.244 The paper advocates formal indigenous participation in 
dispute resolution because there are problems in treating questions 
about indigenous knowledge as a discrete, de-contextualized subject 
of inquiry to be used and judged by other normative systems, rather 
than treating it as an active system that contains its own values, 
norms, uses, standards, criteria and principles for the use of such 
knowledge.  
To avoid this difficulty, indigenous intellectual methodologies 
that express indigenous legal concepts must be embedded in the very 
structure of indigenous dispute resolution.245 Aboriginal vantage 
points should form part of an appropriate balance from a rights 
perspective when judging issues of indigenous legal traditions. This 
paper has tentatively suggested ways in which indigenous norms 
could provide criteria for such judgment. As indigenous normative 
concepts are extended into dispute resolution regimes at the local, 
provincial and national level, a greater range of options will be 
available to tailor solutions that fit particular issues and disputes. This 
is consistent with the sui generis approach to judging indigenous 
rights outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada.246 It would also 
meet the task outlined in R v. Van der Peet:  
The challenge of defining [A]boriginal rights stems from the 
fact that they are rights peculiar to the meeting of two vastly 
 244. The wider context of this issue is discussed in a non-indigenous context in G. BRUCE 
DOERN & MARKUS SHARAPUT, CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE POLITICS OF 
INNOVATING INSTITUTIONS AND INTERESTS (2000). 
 245. See LINDA TUHIWAI SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES: RESEARCH AND 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1999), for an excellent discussion of how indigenous peoples can 
reclaim their own research methodologies. 
 246. R v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.R. 507. 
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dissimilar legal cultures; consequently there will always be a 
question about which legal culture is to provide the vantage 
point from which rights are to be defined . . . a morally and 
politically defensible conception of aboriginal rights will 
incorporate both legal perspectives.247 
 247. Id. at 547. 
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